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11 Introduction
A decision maker typically faces a lot of uncertainty when deciding over a course
of action. For example, investors know they face the risk of losing all their money.
Students do not know which University degree maximises their future job market
prospects. Consumers do not know which product oﬀers the best price/quality ratio...
To be more speciﬁc, suppose someone has the opportunity to invest in a project whose
returns are positively correlated with the “general future health of the U.S. economy”.
Obviously, assessing the future state of the U.S. economy is a hard task and no human
being is smart enough to make an errorless prediction about it. However, investors
do not live like Robinson Crusoe - isolated on an island. Instead, they realise that
the economy is populated by many other potential investors who all face the same
type of risk. Moreover, they know that if they were to meet and exchange opinions,
this would enable them to reduce their forecasting error. But if investors really care
about one another’s opinions, how will this information be disseminated throughout
the economy?
Casual observation of everyday life suggests there are two diﬀerent channels through
which investors may learn about one another’s opinions: one may learn through words
or one may learn through actions. With the former, we have in mind a situation in
which one investor simply tells her opinion to (possibly many) other investors. For
example, every now and then managing directors of important companies appear in
the media and express their opinions on a wide range of issues such as future techno-
logical developments, future oil prices, future market growth, etc... Some institutions
are even specialised in collecting and summarising the opinions of a large number
of market participants. For example, the Munich-based IFO institute for economic
research releases a quarterly index reﬂecting the business conﬁdence of the average
German investor. With learning through actions, we mean that if someone invests in
a one-million-dollar project in the U.S., this reveals her conﬁdence in the American
business climate.
In this paper, we analyse the interaction between both communication channels.
More speciﬁcally, we consider the following set-up: N players must take an investment
decision and possess a private, imperfect signal concerning the future state of the
world. Investment is only proﬁtable in the good state. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that the returns of the investment project only depend on the state of
the world. Hence, for eﬃciency reasons one would want to have all players truthfully
exchanging their signals. Players can invest in two periods. In the second period,
everyone observes how many agents invested at time one. One randomly drawn
2player (the sender) is asked to divulge her private information (i.e. her signal) to the
other players (the receivers) prior to the ﬁrst investment period, and we compute all
monotone equilibria1 of our game.
We ﬁrst show that both communication channels do not co-exist peacefully, in the
sense that there does not exist a monotone equilibrium in which the sender truthfully
announces her private information and in which subsequently a lot of information
is generated through actions. This tension between both communication channels
manifests itself diﬀerently depending on the surplus generated by the project: for low
surplus projects the unique monotone equilibrium is the pooling one2, while for high
surplus projects there also exists an equilibrium in which the sender truthfully re-
veals her private information but in which “little” information is transmitted through
actions.
The intuition behind this result goes as follows: in our model expected payoﬀs are
driven by the relative number of optimists in the economy (the higher the proportion
of optimists in the population, the higher the probability that the world is in the good
state). At time two all players observe the number of period-one investments and use
this knowledge to get an “idea” of the proportion of optimists in the economy. This
updating process depends on the period-one investment strategies3 (which are aﬀected
by the sender’s message). If the investment only generates a low surplus, pessimists
will - independently of the sender’s message - never invest in the ﬁrst period. Both
sender’s types then want to send the message which makes the optimists invest with as
large a probability as possible4. Thus both sender’s types share the same preferences
over the receivers’ actions, and therefore no information can be transmitted through
cheap talk. For high surplus projects, however, this intuition is incomplete. In that
case all players face a positive gain of investing after receiving the message “I am
an optimist”. If a player then believes that everyone will invest at time one, it’s
optimal for her to do so too (i.e. an informational cascade5 in which everyone invests
1Bluntly stated, in a monotone equilibrium we rule out the (unintuitive) possibility that pes-
simistic players are more likely to invest (at time one) than optimistic ones.
2In this equilibrium no credible information is transmitted through words, but “a lot” of infor-
mation is transmitted through actions.
3For example, upon observing k period-one investments, players compute diﬀerent posteriors if
pessimists invested (at time one) with zero probability and optimists with a probability equal to
one, than if pessimists invested with the same probability as the optimists.
4If the sender succeeds for example in making the optimistic receivers invest with probability
one, she perfectly learns the proportion of optimists in the population.
5All players - irrespective of their private information - rely on the public information (i.e. the
message of the sender) and take the same action at time one. By deﬁnition, this is an informational
cascade.
3is ignited by the arrival of a favourable message). In our model this informational
cascade induces a pessimist to send the message “I am a pessimist”: if she were to
deviate and sent instead the message “I am an optimist”, she wouldn’t be able to
learn anything about the proportion of optimists in the population and would never
invest. An optimist faces a high opportunity cost of waiting, and independently of
her message, invests at time one. Hence, she cannot gain by sending the message “I
am a pessimist”.6
We next argue that our analysis allows us to draw some positive and norma-
tive conclusions. In particular, we show that an investment subsidy, by artiﬁcially
increasing the surplus generated by the project, promotes truthful revelation of pri-
vate information. However, this does not mean that an investment subsidy always
increases welfare: a social planner knows that if the subsidy induces truthful reve-
lation, this comes at the cost of less information transmission through actions. In
the paper we show that a social planner may even want to tax investments to cause
information to be revealed through actions instead of words. Finally, we also show
that a more able sender (i.e. a sender possessing a more precise signal) has more
incentives to truthfully reveal her private information than a less able one.
This paper belongs to the literature on informational cascades (see a.o. Baner-
jee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer and Welch (BHW,1992), Chamley and Gale
(CG,1994), Chamley (2001),...). Those papers assume away any preplay commu-
nication and study the eﬃciency properties of social learning (= learning through
actions). We provide a justiﬁcation for this approach: for low surplus projects, no
information can be transmitted through words because players want to inﬂuence their
future learning capabilities. In those papers the public information is the consequence
of some costly actions undertaken by the early movers: for example a second mover
knows that the ﬁrst mover is an optimist because she spent money to undertake a new
investment project. Hence, in those papers the credibility of the public information is
not an issue. In this paper it is costless to send public information, and its credibility
must therefore be carefully checked. Those papers show how an informational cascade
develops as a consequence of the arrival of some early (and credible) information. In
this paper, we show that the causality can also be reversed: it is the informational
cascade, by reducing the gain of sending the message ”I am an optimist”, which causes
the public information to be credible.
6Note that in the separating equilibrium information only gets transmitted through actions when
the sender announces “I am a pessimist”. As will become clear below, the amount of information
produced after the arrival of an unfavourable message is always lower than the one that would have
been produced in the absence of cheap talk (or in the pooling equilibrium).
4Obviously, this is not the ﬁrst paper to investigate the credibility of cheap talk
statements. In a seminal paper, Crawford and Sobel (1982) already analysed the
issue of information transmission through cheap talk. However, in their model the
receiver chooses an action which inﬂuences both player’s payoﬀs after having received
a message from the informed sender. In our model the sender ﬁrst sends a message
and then plays a (waiting) game with the receivers. Farrell (1987,1988), Farrell and
Gibbons (1989) and Baliga and Morris (2000) also assume that both players play
a game after having received or sent a message. However, they consider a very
diﬀerent game: in Farrell (1987,1988) and Baliga and Morris the communication
stage is followed by a coordination game, while in Farrell and Gibbons both players
engage in a bargaining game after the communication stage. As we consider a (very)
diﬀerent game, we also get very diﬀerent results: Crawford and Sobel have shown
how the credibility of cheap talk statements are undermined when the sender and
the receiver have diﬀerent preferences over the optimal action, Baliga and Morris
argued that positive spillovers impede information exchange, while we show how social
learning may destroy incentives for truthtelling (and how informational cascades help
in restoring these incentives).
This paper is organised as follows. In section two, we present our two-stage game.
In the third section, we take the players’ posteriors as given and solve for all monotone
continuation equilibria. We next compute equilibrium strategies in the sender-receiver
game (section four). We ﬁrst show how the credibility of cheap talk may be under-
mined when players can postpone their investment decisions (Proposition 2). Next,
we show how this credibility can be restored by an informational cascade (Propo-
sition 3). In section 5, we discuss some normative and positive implications of our
theory. In section 6 we analyse the case in which the sender may be uninformed.
Final comments are summarised in the seventh and ﬁnal section.
2 The Model
Assume that a population of N ≥ 5 risk neutral players must decide whether to in-
vest in a risky project or not. The value V of the investment project can take two
values: V ∈{ 1,0}, with equal probabilities . The state of the economy is described
by Θ ∈{ G,B}.I fΘ=G the good state prevails and V = 1 whereas if Θ = B,t h e
economy is in a bad state and V = 0. The cost of the investment project is denoted
by c. Each player receives a private, conditionally independent signal concerning the
realised state of the world. Formally, player l’s signal sl ∈{ g,b} (l =1 ,...,N) where
Pr(g|G)=P r ( b|B)=p>1
2. We assume that:
5A1: 1 − p<c<p .
A1 implies that a player who received signal g is - a priori - willing to invest (Pr(G|g)=
p>c ), and that a player who received a signal b is a priori not willing to invest
(Pr(G|b)=1−p<c ). Henceforth, we call a player who received a good (bad) signal
an optimist (pessimist)7.I fc ≤ 1
2 (c>1
2), we call the investment opportunity a high
(low) surplus project. We analyse the stage game that unfolds as follows:
-1 The state of nature is realised and players receive signals,
0 A randomly selected player i is asked to report her signal. Her message, ˆ si ∈
{g,b}, is made public to all the other players,
1 All players make investment decisions,
2 All players observe who invested at time one, and those who haven’t invested
yet make new investment decisions,
3 All players learn the true state of the world. Payoﬀs are received and the game
ends.
In the ﬁrst stage (time zero) player i (= the sender) inﬂuences the posteriors of the
remaining players (= the receivers), and thus the equilibrium strategies at the second
stage (time one and two). Henceforth we call the second stage the waiting game (or
the continuation game). At time one, player l must choose an action, al,f r o mt h e
set {invest, wait}. At time two all players who waited at time one must choose an
action from the set {invest, not invest}. Each player only possesses one investment
opportunity, so a period-one investor cannot invest in a second project at time two.
Investments are irreversible. If a player does not invest in any of the two periods, she
gets zero. Investment decisions at period one are represented by a N-vector x where
the l-th coordinate equals 1 if player l invested at time one and zero otherwise. δ
denotes the discount factor.
We let ht (t =0 ,1,2) denote the history of the game at time t.T h u sh0 = {∅},
h1 =ˆ si and h2 =( ˆ si,x). Ht denotes the set of all possible histories at time t, and the
set of histories is H =
 2
t=0 Ht. A symmetric behavioural strategy for the receivers
7Observe that in our model all players are Bayesian rational: optimists (pessimists) do not
overestimate (underestimate) the probability that Θ = G. Hence, our deﬁnitions diﬀer from the
ones that are used by behavioural economists. However, these deﬁnitions are intuitive and should
not confuse the reader.
6is a function ρ : {g,b}×H → [0,1] with the interpretation that ρ(sj,h t) represents
the probability of investing at date t given sj and ht (j =1 ,...,N and j  = i). For
instance, ρ(g,b) is the probability that an optimistic receiver invests at time one
given that ˆ si = b, and ρ(b,g) is the probability that a pessimistic receiver invests at
time one given that ˆ si = g. Since each player can only invest once, ρ(sj,h 2)=0
if player j invested at time one, and ρ(sj,h 0) = 0 since no one can invest at time
zero. A behavioural strategy for the sender is a function σ : {g,b}×H → [0,1].
σ(g,h0)( σ(b,h0)) represents the probability with which an optimistic (pessimistic)
sender sends ˆ si = g. σ(·,h 1)( σ(·,h 2)) represents the probability that player i invests
at date one (two). As before, σ(·,h 2) = 0 if the sender invested in the ﬁrst period.
Let ρ1 ≡ (ρ(b,h1),ρ(g,h1)), σ1 ≡ (σ(b,h1),σ(g,h1)) and σ0 ≡ (σ(b,h0),σ(g,h0)).
Suppose player j is an optimistic receiver. At time one, player j computes qω ≡
Pr(G|sj = g,ˆ si,σ(g,h0),σ(b,h0)). If σ(g,h0) = 1 and σ(b,h0) = 0 (in this case an
optimistic sender always sends a favourable message, while a pessimist always sends
an unfavourable one) then qω =
p2
p2+(1−p)2 ≡ qω after a good message, and qω = 1
2 after
a bad message. A simple computation shows that for all values of ˆ si,σ(g,h0),σ(b,h0),
qω ∈ [1
2,qω], and that all values in the interval are attained for some values of σ(g,h0),
σ(b,h0) and ˆ si. Similarly, qπ denotes a pessimist’s posterior probability that Θ = G





p2+(1−p)2. Henceforth, to save on notations, we will, in
general, not include σ(·) and ρ(·) in our list of conditioning variables. This omission
should not confuse the reader as it will be obvious which σ(·) and ρ(·) enter into the
computation of a player’s posterior.
When solving our game, we rely on four equilibrium selection criteria. First,
we require a candidate equilibrium to belong to the class of the perfect Bayesian
equilibria. Henceforth, σ∗(·)( ρ∗(·)) denotes the value taken by σ(·)( ρ(·)) in a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). In a PBE strategies and beliefs (concerning the other
players’ types) must be such that (i) the sender cannot gain by choosing a σ  = σ∗ given
her beliefs and given ρ∗, (ii) receivers cannot gain by choosing a ρ  = ρ∗ given their
beliefs and given σ∗ and (iii) beliefs must be computed using Bayes’s rule whenever
possible. As usual, a pooling equilibrium is a PBE in which σ∗(g,h0)=σ∗(b,h0).
In that case the message ˆ si = g is as likely to come from an optimistic as from a
pessimistic sender. Hence, in that case messages have no informational content and
do not aﬀect posteriors. For the sake of concreteness (and wlog), we assume that
σ∗(g,h0) ≥ σ∗(b,h0). This assumption merely deﬁnes message ˆ si = g as the one
which inﬂuences posteriors in a (weakly) favourable way. Under this assumption,
a separating equilibrium is a PBE in which σ∗(g,h0) = 1 and σ∗(b,h0)=0 . N o t e
that at time one qω can be diﬀerent from p (the posterior of the receivers may diﬀer
7from the sender’s). Therefore, we do not impose σ∗(g,h1) to be equal to ρ∗(g,h1).
Similarly, we allow σ∗(b,h1) to be diﬀerent from ρ∗(b,h1).
Second, we restrict ourselves to the class of monotone strategies. Consider players
l and l  (where l or l  may be the sender). Call q (q ) the time-one posteriors of player
l (l ) (where q and q  ∈{ 1 − p,qπ,p,q ω}). Strategies are said to be monotone if they
possess the following two properties: 1) if q = q ,t h e nP r ( l invests at time one) = Pr(l 
invests at time one), 2) if Pr(l invests at time one) > Pr(l  invests at time one), then
q>q  . Remark that from the ﬁrst property, monotone strategies are symmetric. Note
that the ﬁrst property implies that whenever the sender’s message is uninformative,
the sender invests at period 1 with the same probability as a receiver of the same
type, which need not hold in symmetric strategies. Property two implies that the
time-one investment probabilities (weakly) increase in the time-one posteriors. We
do not expect “real-world” players to play non-monotone strategies, and, in that
sense, we believe this to be a realistic restriction on the strategy proﬁles.
Third, consider a candidate equilibrium in which optimistic (pessimistic) receivers
randomise at time one with probability ˆ ρ(g,·)( ˆ ρ(b,·)). We require each PBE to be
stable in the following sense: suppose player j is an optimistic (pessimistic) receiver.
Suppose she anticipates all other optimistic (pessimistic) receivers to randomise with
probability ˆ ρ(g,·)− 1 (ˆ ρ(b,·)− 1) (where  1 represents an arbitrary small, but strictly
positive number). Then, it must be optimal for player j to invest at time one.
Finally, we require every candidate equilibrium to be robust to the introduction
of an  -reputational cost. More speciﬁcally, we assume that with probability  2 re-
ceivers detect any “lie” (i.e. the optimistic sender who sends message ˆ si = b,o rt h e
pessimistic sender who sends message ˆ si = g) from the sender, in which case she
suﬀers a reputational cost equal to  3. It is important to note that  2 is unrelated to
the sender’s behaviour in the continuation game. This assumption ensures that the
sender’s behaviour in the continuation game is only driven by informational reasons
(and not by her desire to “mask” a past lie). Let   ≡  2. 3 and we assume that  
represents an arbitrary small, but strictly positive, number. With this reputational
cost, an optimistic sender prefers to send a favourable to an unfavourable message
(as will become clear below, in the absence of this  , she would be indiﬀerent between
the two messages).
3 Strategic Waiting
Before proving the existence of a PBE in our game, we restrict our attention to
monotone continuation equilibria. Henceforth, ˜ σ(·)( ˜ ρ(·)) denotes the value taken by
8σ(·)( ρ(·)) in a monotone continuation equilibrium (MCE). A MCE is identical to a
PBE except that we do not require the sender to choose ˜ σ0 optimally given her beliefs
and given equilibrium behaviour in the continuation game. Stated diﬀerently, in a
MCE we do not endogenise the receivers’ time-one posteriors. Instead, we just treat
them as if they were exogenous and compute all monotone continuation equilibria.
Note that every PBE is a MCE, while the contrary need not hold.
Our model is void of any competition eﬀects or positive network externalities.
Hence, a player’s expected gain of investing is solely determined by the relative num-
ber of optimists (as compared to the number of pessimists) in the population. Call n
the random number of optimists in our population. The higher n (for any ﬁxed N),
the higher Pr(G|n) and the higher the expected gain from investing. Unfortunately,
by postponing one’s investment decision, players observe x instead of n. Hence, at
time two all players who waited at time one face an inference problem: on the basis
of x they must try to get “as precise an idea” about n.
As we only consider symmetric strategies, player i does not care about who invests,
but rather in how many players invest. Therefore, from the sender’s point of view
all information contained in x can be summarised by ks (= the number of receivers
who invest at time one).8 Similarly, from a receiver’s point of view all information
contained in x can be summarised by k (= the number of remaining receivers who
invest at time one) and ai (= the time-one action of the sender). Note that k = ks
or k = ks − 1.
We thus continue our analysis by working with k, ks and ai.L e tq ∈{ qπ,q ω,1 −
p,p}.I fp l a y e rj waits, she observes k and ai and invests if Pr(G|q,k,ai) ≥ c. Hence,
for a given k and ai player j’s payoﬀ equals max{0,Pr(G|q,k,ai) − c}. Of course,
player j cannot ex ante know the realization of k and ai. Therefore, player j’s ex ante






max{0,Pr(G|q,k,ai) − c}Pr(k|q,ai)Pr(ai|q). (1)







We know enough to start analysing equilibrium behaviour in the continuation game.
We ﬁrst investigate the case in which the project is a low surplus one (i.e. c>1
2)
and in which the sender truthfully announces that she’s an optimist (i.e. qπ =
1
2
8In mathematical terms, we mean that Pr(n|x,si) = Pr(n|ks,s i), ∀n.
9and qω = qω). This case is both simple and rich enough to capture many important
mechanisms of our model. We show that in this case there exists a unique MCE in
which ˜ σ(b,g)=˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g) = 0 and ˜ ρ(g,g) ∈ (0,1). As 1 − p<1
2 =P r ( G|sj =
b, ˆ si = g) <c , it trivially follows that ˜ σ(b,g) and ˜ ρ(b,g) equal zero. To understand
why ˜ σ(g,g) also equals zero, we ﬁrst must understand how ˜ ρ(g,g) is determined
and how it varies with changes in q. As all receivers know that si = g and that




max{0,Pr(G|qω,k,wait) − c}Pr(k|qω, wait). (3)
To gain some insight behind equations (1), (2) and (3), it is useful to contrast the
polar case in which equation (3) is evaluated at ρ(g,g) = 0 with the other one in
which (3) is evaluated at ρ(g,g) = 1. Thus, suppose that ρ(g,g)=0 .T h e n ,
Pr(k =0 ,|qω,a i =w a i t , ˜ σ(b,g)=˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g)=ρ(g,g)=0 )=1 .
At time two, player j computes Pr(G|qω,0, wait) = qω. This is intuitive: player j,
independently of n, always observes zero period-one investments. Stated diﬀerently,
if ρ(g,g) = 0, it’s as if she doesn’t receive any additional information concerning
the realised state of the world. Therefore she has no reason to change her posterior
and Pr(G|qω,0, wait) = qω. Hence, W(qω,(0,0),(0,0)) = qω − c. Suppose now that
ρ(g,g) = 1. Then, in the next period player j learns how many optimists are present
in the economy (i.e. n = k+2)9.A tt i m et w op l a y e rj computes Pr(G|n), and invests
if Pr(G|n) ≥ c. As before, player j cannot ex ante know how many optimists are




max{0,Pr(G|n) − c}Pr(n|qω) (4)
Lemma 1 ∀N ≥ 5, W(q,σ1,(0,1)) >q− c.
Proof: See Appendix.
To understand Lemma 1, in this paragraph we intuitively explain why ∀N ≥ 5,
W(qω,(0,0),(0,1)) > qω − c.W ec a nr e w r i t ep l a y e rj’s gain of investing as follows:




9By assumption, player j is an optimist who waited at time one. Moreover, we analyse a case in
which player j learned (through the sender’s message) that si = g. Therefore, n = k +2 .
10Suppose ρ(g,g) = 1 and assume that player j decides to wait at time one and then
to invest unconditionally (i.e. to invest at time two independently of n). The above
equality merely states that investing at time one is payoﬀ-equivalent (net of discount-
ing costs) to unconditionally investing at time two. Equation (4) learns us that wait-
ing (when ρ(g,g) = 1) is equivalent to making an optimal conditional second-period
investment decision. Observe that n cannot take a value lower than two because
both players j and i are assumed to be optimists. If Pr(G|n = 2) is higher or equal
than c, then the optimal conditional second-period investment decision always coin-
cides with unconditionally investing at time two. This means that qω − c is equal
to W(qω,(0,0),(0,1)). Hence, W(qω,(0,0),(0,1)) is strictly greater than qω − c if
(and only if) Pr(G|n =2 )<c . In this model all players possess a signal of the same
precision and Pr(Θ = G)=1
2. Therefore, ∀ c ∈ (1−p,p) it takes three pessimistic re-
ceivers to refrain an optimist, who learned through the sender’s message that si = g,
from investing (and therefore N must be greater or equal than ﬁve).
Lemma 1 holds ∀q. This is intuitive: suppose for instance that player j antici-
pates that Θ = G with probability qω < qω. this means that player j puts a (strictly)
positive probability on the event that si = b (and thus that n = 1). As Pr(G|n =
1) < Pr(G|n = 2), it follows that qω −c is also strictly lower than W(qω,(0,0),(0,1)).
Lemma 1 holds ∀σ1. This is also intuitive: whenever σ(g,h1)  = σ(b,h1), the sender’s
time-one action conveys some information about her type. Obviously, this cannot





The ﬁrst inequality of A2 puts a lower bound on the discount factor δ such that an
optimistic receiver, who learned (through the sender’s message) that si = g, faces a
positive option value of waiting (i.e. if player j expects all the optimistic receivers to
invest and all the other players to wait, then she rather waits). The ﬁrst inequality
ensures thus that ˜ ρ(g,g) < 1. The second inequality ensures that ˜ ρ(g,g) > 0.
Lemma 2 Under A2, q − c<δ W(q,(0,0),(0,1)).
Proof: See Appendix.
In words, Lemma 2 states that if a player who possesses the highest possible posterior
faces a positive option value of waiting, then this will also be true for all less optimistic
ones. The intuition behind Lemma 2 will be explained on the basis of Graph 2 below.
Equation (3) is increasing in ρ(g,g). To see this, compare the following two “sce-
narios”. In scenario one all optimistic receivers randomise with probability ρ (g,g),
11in scenario two all optimistic receivers randomise with probability ρ(g,g) <ρ  (g,g).
Call nr the number of optimistic receivers.10 Call k  (k) the number of players in-
vesting at time one when nr − 1 optimistic receivers invest with probability ρ (g,g)
(ρ(g,g)). Now, having nr − 1 players investing with probability ρ(g,g)i se xa n t e
equivalent to the following two-stage experiment: ﬁrst let all nr − 1 players invest
with probability ρ (g,g). Next let all k  investors re-randomise with probability
ρ(g,g)
ρ(g,g).
Therefore the statistic k is generated by adding noise to the statistic k . Therefore k 
is a suﬃcient statistic for k. From Blackwell’s value of information theorem (1951)
we know that this implies that W(qω,(0,0),(0,ρ  (g,g))) ≥ W(qω,(0,0),(0,ρ(g,g))).
Moreover, Chamley and Gale (1994, Proposition 2) have shown that
∀ρ(g,g),ρ
 (g,g) ∈ [0,λ],W(qω,(0,0),(0,ρ(g,g))) = W(qω,(0,0),(0,ρ
 (g,g))), while
∀ρ
 (g,g) >λ ,W(qω,(0,0),(0,ρ(g,g))) <W(qω,(0,0),(0,ρ
 (g,g))).
This line of reasoning also extends to equations (1) and (2)11.
Intuitively, ρ(g,g) captures the ex ante amount of information produced by the
optimistic receivers. The higher ρ(g,g), the easier one can infer n out of k (this can
best be seen by comparing the two polar cases where ρ(g,g) = 0 and ρ(g,g)=1( s e e








Graph 1: Existence of a MCE in which ˜ ρ(g,g) ∈ (0,1).
In equilibrium the gain of waiting must be equal to the gain of investing, i.e. qω−c =
δW(qω,(0,0),(0, ˜ ρ(g,g)). If ρ(g,g)=λ, δW(qω,(0,0),(0,λ)) = δ[qω − c] < qω − c.I f
10Note that nr = n if si = b,o t h e r w i s enr = n − 1.
11For a formal proof, see the Appendix.
12ρ(g,g) = 1, by A2, δW(qω,(0,0),(0,1)) > qω − c. By monotonicity, as qω >cthere
exists a unique ˜ ρ(g,g) which makes the optimists indiﬀerent between investing and
waiting. So far, we assumed that ˜ σ(g,g) = 0 and showed that ˜ ρ(g,g) ∈ (0,1). We
still must explain why the gain of waiting of the optimistic sender exceeds her gain
of investing. Consider therefore the following graph.
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Graph 2: The eﬀect of a change in qω on ˜ ρ(g,h1).
The Graph above addresses the question: “What happens with ˜ ρ(g,h1)i fqω in-
creases?” Suppose player j ﬁrst anticipates that Θ = G with probability qω.A s
before, graph two shows the existence of a unique ˜ ρ(g,h1) where the gain of investing
equals the gain of waiting. Assume now that for some exogenous reason player j
becomes “more optimistic” in the sense that she now anticipates that Θ = G with
probability q

ω >q ω. Graph two shows that the comparison between ˜ ρ(·) and ˜ ρ
(·)
depends on the relative strength of two opposing eﬀects. On the one hand, an increase
in qω increases an optimist’s gain of investing, which, were W(·) independent of qω,
would increase ρ(g,h1)f r o m˜ ρ(g,h1)t op o i n ta in graph two. On the other hand,
an increase in qω also leads to an increase in the gain of waiting. This second eﬀect
decreases ρ(g,h1)f r o mp o i n ta until the point ˜ ρ

(g,h1). The relative strength of both
eﬀects ultimately depends on how the shift of the gain of waiting compares to the
one of the gain of investing. One can show that the ﬁrst eﬀect always dominates the
second one and thus that ˜ ρ

(g,h1) > ˜ ρ(g,h1).
The intuition behind this result mainly lies in the presence of a discount factor
in the model. An increase in qω increases W(qω,·) for two diﬀerent reasons: (i) it
increases the likelihood that Pr(G|qω,k,a i) >cand thus that player j will get a
non-zero expected utility and (ii) it increases her expected gain of investing whenever
13player j does so. However, the presence of δ in front of W(qω,·) (and not in front
of qω − c) dampens this increase in W(qω,·). Note that in this and our previous
paragraph, our reasoning did not rely on the fact that in our limit case σ1 =( 0 ,0)
and σ(b,h0) = 0. Actually, one can show that this positive correlation between ˜ ρ(·)
and qω is robust in the sense that it holds ∀σ1. Graph 2 also provides the intuition
behind Lemma 2. To see this, suppose that q

ω = qω and that ρ1 =( 0 ,1). From
A2, we know that q

ω − c<δ W (q

ω,(0,0),(0,1)). From Graph 2 follows that ∀q,
δW(q,(0,0),(0,1)) >q− c (the downward shift in the gain of investing overcompen-
sates the one in the gain of waiting).
There are two diﬀerent reasons why ˜ σ(g,g) = 0: the ﬁrst one is due to the fact
that the sender observes ks and not k, the second one is due to the fact that p<qω.
To illustrate the ﬁrst reason suppose the sender’s posterior probability that Θ = G
equals the one of the optimistic receivers. One can think about the statistics k and
ks as follows. Let the nr optimistic receivers invest with probability ˜ ρ(·). Next,
construct k as follows: if player j invested12, k = ks − 1, otherwise k = ks. Hence,
ks is a suﬃcient statistic for k and, thus, player i’s gain of waiting cannot be lower
than player j’s. To illustrate the second reason, suppose that if the sender waits, she
observes k instead of ks.C a l l a the probability with which the optimistic receivers
must invest to make an optimistic sender indiﬀerent between investing and waiting.
From Graph 1, we know that a ∈ (0,1). As qω >p , from the explanation of Graph 2
we know that ˜ ρ(g,g) >a . From Proposition 2 of Chamley and Gale (1994) we know
that this implies that p − c<δ W(p,(0, ˜ ρ(g,g))). We know enough to state:
Proposition 1 (Characterisation of all MCE’s)
1) If qπ < 1 − p<c<q ω <p , ∃ a unique MCE in which ˜ ρ(b,b)=˜ σ(b,b)=0and
˜ ρ(g,b) ∈ [0,1), ˜ σ(g,b)=1 .
2) If qπ < 1−p<q ω ≤ c<p , ∃ a unique MCE in which ˜ ρ(b,b)=˜ σ(b,b)=˜ ρ(g,b)=0
and ˜ σ(g,b)=1 .
3) If 1−p<q π <c<p<q ω, ∃ a unique MCE in which ˜ σ(b,g)=˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g)=0
and ˜ ρ(g,g) ∈ (0,1).
4) If 1−p<c≤ qπ < 1
2 <p<q ω, ∃ an MCE in which ˜ σ(b,g)=˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g)=0
and ˜ ρ(g,g) ∈ (0,1). Depending on the values of our exogenous parameters, there may
also exist one (and only one) other MCE in which ˜ σ(b,g)=0and ˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g)=
˜ ρ(g,g)=1 .
5) If 1 − p<c≤ qπ = 1
2 <p<q ω = qω, ∃ two MCE’s. In the ﬁrst one ˜ σ(b,g)=
˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g)=0and ˜ ρ(g,g) ∈ (0,1). In the second one ˜ σ(b,g)=0and ˜ ρ(b,g)=
12Remind that player j is an optimistic receiver who is indiﬀerent between investing and waiting
and who, therefore, invests with probability ˜ ρ(·).
14˜ σ(g,g)=˜ ρ(g,g)=1 .
6) If qπ =1− p<c<q ω = p, ∃ a unique MCE in which ˜ σ(b,h1)=˜ ρ(b,h1)=0and
˜ σ(g,h1)=˜ ρ(g,h1) ∈ (0,1).
Proof: See Appendix.
In cases 1) and 2) we characterise all MCE’s when σ(b,h0) <σ (g,h0) and when the
sender sent ˆ si = b. In cases 3), 4) and 5) we characterise all MCE’s when σ(b,h0) <
σ(g,h0) and when the sender sent ˆ si = g. Case 6) considers the case in which the
sender’s message did not aﬀect the receiver’s posteriors (i.e. σ(b,h0)=σ(g,h0)).
In case 1), qω <p . As we are focusing on monotone strategies we assume that
ρ(g,b) ≤ σ(g,b). There does not exist a MCE in which both the optimistic receivers
and the optimistic sender randomise as this contradicts (a.o.) the insight summarised
in Graph 2. There are two possibilities: (i) δW(qω,(0,1),(0,0)) ≥ qω − c or (ii)
δW(qω,(0,1),(0,0)) <q ω − c. To understand the important distinction between
(i) and (ii), suppose that sj = g and that player j anticipates all receivers to wait
at time one. As already argued above, k does then not contain any information
about the realisation of nr.A s˜ σ1 =( 0 ,1), ai perfectly reveals the sender’s type. In
possibility (i), the informational gain of observing ai exceeds the discounting cost,
and, thus, player j prefers to wait. Similarly, an optimistic sender, anticipating that
˜ ρ1 =( 0 ,0), faces no informational gain of waiting while its discounting cost is positive.
Hence, it’s in her best interest to invest at time one and, thus, there exists a MCE
in which ˜ ρ1 =( 0 ,0) and ˜ σ1 =( 0 ,1). We now explain why in possibility (ii) the
continuation game is characterised by a unique MCE in which ˜ ρ(g,b) ∈ (0,1) and
˜ σ(g,b) = 1. In possibility (ii), the additional information (about the sender’s type)
does not compensate the discounting cost. Hence, there does not exist a MCE in
which ˜ ρ1 =( 0 ,0). From Lemma 2, we know that qω − c<δ W (qω,(0,0),(0,1)).
Obviously,
W(qω,(0,0),(0,1)) ≤ W(qω,(0,1),(0,1)),
because in the former case no information (about the sender’s type) is revealed
through ai, while in the latter case ai perfectly reveals her type. Thus,
δW(qω,(0,1),(0,0)) <q ω − c<δ W(qω,(0,1),(0,1)),
and from CG’s analysis (see Graph 1) we know there exists a unique ˜ ρ(g,b) which
equates an optimist’s gain of investing with her gain of waiting. We are left to
intuitively explain why the optimistic sender, knowing that ˜ ρ1 =( 0 , ˜ ρ(g,b)), prefers










Graph 3: An optimist’s optimal time 1 action after sending ˆ si = b.
To understand graph 3, ﬁrst note that an optimist’s payoﬀ of sending an unfavourable
message equals max{p−c,δW(p,(0, ˜ ρ(g,b)))}. p−c denotes her payoﬀ of investing at
time one, given that she sent an unfavourable message. δW(p,(0, ˜ ρ(g,b))) denotes her
payoﬀ of waiting given that she sent an unfavourable message. Call a the probability
with which optimists must invest to make player i indiﬀerent between investing and
waiting. As the optimists received an unfavourable message, they anticipate that
Θ=G with a probability equal to qω <p . From the insight summarised in Graph
2, we know that ˜ ρ(g,b) <a(because qω <p ). From CG’s analysis follows that
δW(p,(0, ˜ ρ(g,b))) <p− c. Therefore, if an optimist were to sent message b, it would
be optimal for her to invest at time one.13
Case 2) is identical to case 1) except that qω ≤ c. Unsurprisingly, in this case no
one (except the optimistic sender) invests at time one. The intuition why cases 3),
4) and 5) are characterised by a MCE in which only the optimistic receivers invest,
is based on the insights summarised in Graphs 1 and 2. In case 4) we must make a
distinction between the following two possibilities: (i) δW(qπ,(0,1),(1,1)) >q π − c
or (ii) δW(qπ,(0,1),(1,1)) ≤ qπ −c. Observe that in both (i) and (ii), the pessimistic
receivers invest with the same probability as the optimistic ones. As k does then not
contain any information about the realisation of nr, a receiver only wants to wait to
learn the sender’s type. As in case 1), in (i) the informational gain of observing ai
exceeds the discounting cost and there cannot exist a MCE in which all receivers invest
at time one. The contrary situation applies in possibility (ii). Case 5) is identical to
case 4) except that the sender truthfully announced that she’s an optimist. Hence,
observing ai = invest does not yield any additional information about the sender’s
type. Therefore, a pessimistic receiver who anticipates everyone to invest at time one
13Note that in this paragraph, we abstracted from the fact that the sender observes ks, while the
receivers “only” observe k. As proven in the Appendix, as long as we focus on the class of monotone
strategies, this is without loss of generality.
16(i.e. ˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g)=˜ ρ(g,g) = 1), cannot gain by waiting. Case 6 corresponds to
the case originally analysed by CG.
Consider the MCE in which all receivers invest at time one (see cases 4) and 5)).
Note that all receivers possess some public (i.e. the favourable message sent by player
i) and some private information (i.e. their signals). All players, independently of their
signals, rely on the public information by investing at time one. This behaviour is
identical to the one followed by the players inside an informational cascade in BHW’s
and Banerjee’s (1992) model. In those models all players also possess some public (i.e.
the action(s) of the ﬁrst mover(s)) and private information (i.e. their signals) and they,
independently of their signals, all adopt the same action. Therefore, we call the MCE
in which ρ∗(b,g)=ρ∗(g,g) = 1 an informational cascade. Chamley (2001) has shown
that this informational cascade does not hinge on our use of a binomial distribution.
Rather, it can be recovered under a wide range of distributional assumptions.
4 Cheap Talk
We now analyse player i’s incentives to truthfully reveal her private information at
time zero. In our opinion one may think about player i in two ways. First, one may
interpret player i as a “guru” whose opinion concerning investment matters is often
asked by the media. Second, given our assumptions one would want to introduce an
opinion poll (instead of just interviewing one player) at time zero. Unfortunately,
analytical results are harder to get when one introduces other players at time zero.
Therefore one can also interpret our model as one explaining “the economics of opinion
polls” under the simplifying assumption that the size of the opinion poll equals one.
We ﬁrst state and prove the following “negative” result.
Proposition 2 For low surplus projects, there exists a unique monotone PBE in
which σ∗(b,h0)=σ∗(g,h0)=1 . This PBE is supported by the out-of-equilibrium
belief that if ˆ si = b, the sender is a pessimist.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 2 basically states that for projects with low surplus, no information can
be transmitted through cheap talk: as the message ˆ si = g is as likely to come from an
optimistic sender as from a pessimistic one, posteriors are unaﬀected by the sender’s
message. We explain the intuition behind Propositon 2 in two paragraphs. First, we
explain why σ∗(b,h0) must be equal to σ∗(g,h0). Next, we explain why σ∗(b,h0)=
σ∗(g,h0) = 1. This permits us to better highlight the role played by the  -reputational
cost in our model.
17Player i only possesses a noisy signal concerning the realised state of the world
and is primarily interested in knowing n (and this is true for the optimistic as for
the pessimistic sender). From the insight summarised in graph 2, we know that if
player i succeeds to increase qω, this will enable her (whenever ρ(b,h1) remains equal
to zero) to get a “better idea” of n after observing k. Stated diﬀerently, the higher
qω, the higher player i’s gain of waiting (provided that ρ(b,h1) remains equal to zero).
If c>1
2 = qπ, then ρ∗(b,h1) will -independently of σ(g,h0), σ(b,h0) and ˆ si -a l w a y s
be equal to zero. Both sender’s types thus want to send the message which yields
the largest increase in qω and therefore the pessimist loses if she were to reveal her
negative private information. Hence, in the absence of an  -reputational cost, σ∗(b,h0)
cannot be diﬀerent from σ∗(g,h0).
The reason why σ∗(b,h0)=σ∗(g,h0) = 1 is based on our  -reputational cost. As
messages do not aﬀect posteriors, the optimistic sender cannot inﬂuence her gain of
waiting. To avoid paying  , she thus strictly prefers to send ˆ si = g. The pessimistic
sender knows that σ∗(g,h0) = 1. As argued above, if she sends ˆ si = g, she learns
more (about the receivers’ types) than by sending ˆ si = b (note, however, that this
will be at the expense of her reputation). As   → 0, she also strictly prefers to send
ˆ si = g instead of ˆ si = b.
Note that Proposition 2 fundamentally rests on the assumption that players can
wait and observe the period-one investment decisions. If players were not allowed
to observe past investment decisions, our game would be characterised by a unique
PBE in which σ∗(g,h0) = 1 and σ∗(b,h0) = 0. The intuition is simple: if the sender
is optimistic she will, independently of her message, invest in the ﬁrst period. If she
is pessimistic she will, independently of her message, not invest. Hence, to save on
the  -reputational cost, a sender strictly prefers to truthfully report her type. Hence,
Proposition 2 shows how the credibility of cheap talk statements can be adversely
aﬀected when players can learn through actions. As we mentioned in our introduction,
the literature on social learning (see a.o. Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer
and Welch (BHW,1992), Chamley and Gale (CG,1994), Chamley (2001),...) assumes
that information only gets revealed through actions. As those models are void of any
competition eﬀects, some economists wonder why information should not be revealed
through words.14 Proposition 2 thus provides a justiﬁcation for the “ad-hoc” omission
of a cheap-talk communication channel in many herding models. This paper also
14For example, Zwiebel (1995,p.16) wrote:
Relative performance evaluation also justify agents’ unwillingness to share information,
an issue that is problematic in many herding models.
18possesses a more “positive” result which is summarised below.
Proposition 3 For high surplus projects our game is characterised by two monotone
PBE’s: a pooling and a separating one. In the separating equilibrium, ρ∗(b,g)=
ρ∗(g,g)=1 . The pooling equilibrium is supported by the out-of-equilibrium belief that
if ˆ si = b, the sender is a pessimist.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind our pooling equilibrium (in which both sender’s types send the
message ˆ si = g) is identical to the one we explained above. We are left to explain
the intuition behind our separating equilibrium. Suppose the investment project is a
high surplus one (i.e. c ≤ 1
2) and that all receivers revise their posteriors under the
assumption that σ∗(b,h0) = 0 and that σ∗(g,h0) = 1. Consider ﬁrst the optimistic
sender. From the insight summarised in graph 3, we know that if she deviates and
sends ˆ si = b, it’s optimal for her to invest at time one. Similarly, if she sends
ˆ si = g, from point 5 of Proposition 1 we know that it’s optimal for her to invest at
time one along with all the other receivers. Hence, absent the  -reputational cost,a n
optimistic sender is indiﬀerent between the two messages. If she prefers not to be
caught “lying”, she strictly prefers to truthfully report her signal. Consider now the
pessimistic sender. If she sends ˆ si = b, qπ < 1 − p<c<q ω = 1
2.F r o m p o i n t s 1
and 2 of proposition 1 we know that ρ∗(g,b) ∈ [0,1). We now argue that ρ∗(g,b) > 0
if c<1
2. As all receivers know si at time one, no additional information (about the
sender’s type) can be learned through the observation of ai. Therefore, a receiver’s















From Graph 1, we know there exists then a unique ρ∗(g,b) > 0 such that an optimistic
receiver is indiﬀerent between investing and waiting. Hence,





If ˆ si = g, c ≤ qπ = 1
2 <p<q ω. From point 5 of Proposition 1, we know there exists
a MCE in which everyone invests at time one, and thus E(Ui|si = b, ˆ si = g)=0 .
As E(Ui|si = b, ˆ si = b) >E (Ui|si = b, ˆ si = g) (whenever c<1
2), a pessimist strictly
prefers to reveal her unfavourable information.
15See the Appendix for a formal proof.
19In words, a separating equilibrium is fundamentally driven because: (i) both
sender’s types face diﬀerent opportunity costs of waiting and (ii) sending a favourable
message creates an informational cascade. An optimist believes the investment project
is good. For her “time is money” and she is only willing to postpone her investment
plans (with probability one) if pessimists don’t invest and if optimists invest with a
probability higher than a (see Graph 3). Unfortunately these two aims cannot be
simultaneously achieved by none of the two messages. Therefore, in the presence of
an  -reputational cost, she strictly prefers to send ˆ si = g. A pessimist believes the
investment project is bad. She is unwilling to invest unless she observes “relatively
many” optimists investing at time one. If the pessimist were to deviate and sent a
favourable message, an informational cascade would occur, she wouldn’t receive any
payoﬀ-relevant information and she would get zero. Hence, it is the informational
cascade which ultimately induces a pessimist to send an unfavourable message. If
ρ∗(b,h1) would always be equal to zero (as is the case for low surplus projects), a
pessimist would never want to send a negative message because - if this message were
to be believed - this would reduce ρ∗(g,h1).
Observe that Proposition 3 also stresses the importance of the informational cas-
cade to elicit private information. There only exist two monotone PBE’s. There
does thus not exist a monotone PBE in which σ∗(b,h0) <σ ∗(g,h0) and in which
(ρ∗(b,g),ρ ∗(g,g))  =( 1 ,1).
5 Some normative and positive implications of our
theory
5.1 Should we subsidise investments?
Denote by sub an investment subsidy granted to each period-one investor. Call c  ≡
c − sub. A social planner can, by appropriately choosing sub, alter the amount of
learning in two diﬀerent ways. First, by making it relatively more attractive to invest
at time one, she can inﬂuence all players’ gain of waiting in a favourable way. Second,
by setting sub such that c  ≤ 1
2 <c , she changes the sender’s incentives to truthfully
reveal her private information (and thus the nature (separating vs pooling) of the
equilibrium played in our game). In a full-ﬂedged welfare study, one should compute
the value of sub which maximises expected welfare. This exercise, however, is lengthy
and outside the scope of this paper. Rather, in this subsection we assume that
sub ∈ [− ,sub) and highlight some advantages and disadvantages of setting sub  =0 .
If sub = −  (where, as above,   represents an arbitrary small, but strictly positive
20number) this means that the social planner taxes ﬁrst-period investments. Note that
we only allow for a “low” subsidy16 in the sense that
sub < sub ≡ min{sub1,sub2}, where
sub1 ≡ δW(qω,(0,0),(0,1))− (qω − c) and
sub2 ≡ c + p − 1.
If sub < sub1, this means that the most optimistic type in our model still faces a
positive option value of waiting. If sub < sub2, this means that 1 − p<c  .I n t h e
Appendix, we show that ∀sub ∈ [− ,sub), Propositions 2 and 3 are unaﬀected by the
introduction of a ﬁrst-period subsidy, i.e. if c  > 1
2, the unique monotone PBE is the
pooling one, if c  ≤ 1
2 there exists a separating and a pooling equilibrium.
We ﬁrst analyse the case in which the ﬁrst-period subsidy does not change the
nature of the played equilibrium. To illustrate our way of working, suppose the in-
vestment project is a high surplus one and that players always focus on the separating
equilibrium. As mentioned above, in this equilibrium the message of the sender reveals
her type, and strategies of period one are given by: after a good message, everyone
invests in period 1, after a bad message, optimistic receivers invest with probability
ρ∗(g,b), and the remaining players do not invest.
Lemma 3 ∀sub ∈ [0,sub), ρ∗(g,b) is strictly increasing in sub and ρ∗(g,b) < 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind Lemma 3 is straightforward. We are considering a separating
equilibrium. Thus, after the arrival of an unfavourable message, optimistic receivers
know they are the only players in the economy who face a positive gain of investing.
If an optimistic receiver waits, she forfeits the investment subsidy. Hence, the higher
sub, the higher a player’s cost of waiting. However, in equilibrium the gain of waiting
must equal the cost of waiting, and, thus, the higher sub, the higher a player’s gain
of waiting (and from Graph 1 we know that this requires a higher ρ∗(g,b)).
Wel(g,sub,sep)( Wel(b,sub,sep)) denotes the expected payoﬀs (net of the sub-
sidies received) of the optimistic (pessimistic) players given the ﬁrst-period subsidy
16We consider an investment subsidy which may be paid to a potentially very large number of
ﬁrms. In comparison to the investment cost, it is then unlikely that the subsidy would be very
important. We do not have in mind a situation in which a government oﬀers a generous subsidy
to attract an important investment project (e.g. the subsidy oﬀered by the French Government to
attract Eurodisney).
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The ﬁrst term is given by the expected number of optimists multiplied by their ex-
pected utilities. The second is the expected number of optimistic players who invest





(p − c)+( N − 1)p(1 − p)(1 − ρ
∗(g,b))sub. (5)
From Lemma 3 we know that (1−ρ∗(g,b))sub (and thus also Wel(g,sub,sep)) need not
be monotonic in sub. This is intuitive: an increase in sub increases an optimist’s gain
of waiting, but also reduces the probability that an optimist will wait and eﬀectively
beneﬁt from a more informative signal. For pessimists, one has











p2 +( 1− p)2,(0,1),(0,ρ
∗(g,b)))+δW(1−p,(0,ρ
∗(g,b)))].
The ﬁrst term corresponds to the expected welfare for pessimistic receivers given an
optimistic sender. Similarly, the ﬁrst term between square brackets corresponds to
the expected welfare of all pessimistic receivers given a pessimistic sender. The second
term between square brackets corresponds to the expected utility of the pessimistic
sender. In the Appendix, we prove that Wel(b,sub,sep) is strictly increasing in sub.
This is also intuitive: the higher sub, the higher ρ∗(g,b) and the higher a pessimist’s
gain of waiting. Total social welfare equals
Wel(sub,sep)=Wel(g,sub,sep)+Wel(b,sub,sep).
Suppose now all players focus on the pooling equilibrium. From above, we know that
both sender’s types then send the message ˆ si = g, that optimists invest with prob-
ability ρ∗(g,g) and that pessimists do not invest. Note that receiving the message
17With probability 1
2, the sender is pessimistic, in which case 2p(1−p)(N −1) optimistic receivers
invest at time one with probability ρ∗(g,b); with probability 1
2, the sender is optimistic, in which
case (p2 +( 1− p)2)(N − 1) + 1 optimistic players (= conditional expected number of optimistic
receivers plus the optimistic sender) invest at time one with probability one.
22ˆ si = g in the pooling equilibrium is informationally diﬀerent from receiving the same
message in the separating one (and, more importantly, leads to a diﬀerent behav-
iour in the continuation game). To avoid confusion, in this subsection we denote by
ρ∗(g,h1)( ρ∗(g,g)) the probability with which all optimists invest at time one in the
pooling (separating) equilibrium. Here again, we estimate the social welfare sepa-
rately for optimists and for pessimists (total welfare is denoted by Wel(sub,pool)).















Lemma 4 ∀sub ∈ [0,sub), ρ∗(g,h1) is strictly increasing in sub and ρ∗(g,h1) < 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition is similar to the one behind Lemma 3. As above, Wel(g,sub,pool) need
not be monotonic in sub, while Wel(b,sub,pool) strictly increases in sub.O u rm a i n
result is summarised below.
Proposition 4 If the subsidy does not alter the nature of the played equilibrium, any
sub ∈ (0,sub) is (strictly) better (for welfare) than no subsidy at all. The relationship
between welfare and sub need, however, not be monotonic.
Proof: From Lemmas 3 and 4 follows that ∀sub ∈ (0,sub)( 1− ρ∗(g,b))sub and
(1 − ρ∗(g,h1))sub are both strictly positive. This result, combined with our earlier
insight (proven in the Appendix) that equations (6) and (8) are strictly increasing
in sub, shows that Wel(sub,sep) >W e l (0,sep) and Wel(sub,pool) >W e l (0,pool).
Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 is not very surprising: because of the information externality the
social beneﬁt of investing at time one exceeds the private one. Hence, a social planner
ﬁxes sub > 0 to close the gap between both beneﬁts. However, it would be premature
to conclude that - in the presence of information externalities - investments must
always be subsidised as the example below suggests.
Suppose c = 1
2 and that our players focus on the separating equilibrium. We now
show that the social planner can increase welfare by imposing an arbitrarily small,
but strictly positive, investment tax (i.e. sub = − ). We ﬁrst compute Wel(0,sep).
23Observe that in the separating equilibrium Pr(G|sj = g,ˆ si = b)=1
2 = c, and thus








p2 +( 1− p)2,(0,1),(0,0)) = δW(1 − p,(0,0)) = 0,
and from equation (6) we know that
Wel(b,0,sep)=( N − 1)p(1 − p)(
1
2
− c)=0 . (10)




(p − c). (11)
This is intuitive: if ˆ si = g, pessimists invest at time one and get a zero payoﬀ. If
ˆ si = b, ρ∗(g,b) = 0 and our pessimistic players also get a zero payoﬀ. Hence, if c = 1
2
total welfare is only determined by the expected utilities of the optimistic players. If
ˆ si = g, all optimists invest at time one. If ˆ si = b, optimistic receivers do not invest,
but nonetheless obtain the same payoﬀ (i.e. zero) as the one they would obtain if
they were to invest at time one. Stated diﬀerently, unconditionally investing at time
one is - for an optimist - payoﬀ equivalent to the alternative strategy in which she
only invests if ˆ si = g. Thus, an optimist gets p−c and, in expected terms, half of the
population is optimistic. Thus, welfare equals
N
2 (p − c).
If sub = − , c  > 1




(p − c) and Wel(b,− ,pool)=δW(1 − p,(0,ρ
∗(g,h1))).
As ρ∗(g,h1) >ρ ∗(g,b) = 0, pessimists beneﬁt from a more informative statistic in
the pooling equilibrium and thus Wel(0,sep) <We l (− ,pool). Our main insight is
summarised below.
Proposition 5 An investment tax can - by altering the nature of the played equilib-
rium - (strictly) increase welfare.
245.2 How does the sender’s ability inﬂuence her incentives for
truthful revelation?
So far we assumed that the sender was “as able” as the receivers in the sense that all
players possess a signal of the same precision. One may ﬁnd it more natural to endow
player i with a more precise signal. After all, in our model she can be interpreted as
a guru and people typically think of them as being better informed (that’s the reason
why they appear in the media). There is a straightforward way to allow for a better
informed sender. Let’s assume that player i’s signal is drawn from the distribution:
Pr(g|G)=P r ( b|B)=r and Pr(b|G)=P r ( g|B)=1 −r (where 1 >r>p ). The higher
r, the “smarter” or the better informed the sender. Our main result is summarised
below:
Proposition 6 ∀c ∈ (1 − p,min{p,
(1−p)r
(1−p)r+p(1−r)}), ∃ a separating equilibrium. This
range of parameter values cannot decrease in the precision of the sender’s signal.
Proof: A MCE in which ˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ ρ(g,g) = 1 exists only if Pr(G|b, ˆ si = g) ≥ c. This
posterior probability is now computed as:
Pr(G|b, ˆ si = g)=
Pr(G,ˆ si = g|b)
Pr(ˆ si = g|b)
=
(1 − p)r





Using a reasoning identical to the one we outlined above, one can check that, if
c ∈ (1 − p,
(1−p)r
(1−p)r+p(1−r)), there exists a separating equilibrium. Q.E.D.
The intuition behind proposition 6 is simple. As we showed in Proposition 3, a
separating equilibrium exists if ρ∗(b,g) = 1. In other words, a separating equilibrium
only exists if the sender can make the pessimists change their minds. Proposition 6
therefore rests on the intuitive idea that the “smarter” the sender (or the more precise
her private information), the “easier” it will be for her to make the pessimists change
their minds. If the sender cannot convince the remaining pessimists to invest at time
one (either because the sender is commonly perceived to be “stupid” or because the
investment project only generates a low surplus) then she doesn’t want to reveal
any unfavourable information because this will worsen her second-period inference
problem.
6 The case of an uninformed sender
So far, we did not allow the sender to be uninformed. One may ﬁnd this a restrictive
assumption. However in this section we argue that the central result of our paper
also holds with an uninformed sender.
25Suppose that with some probability   (where, as above,   represents an arbitrarily
small, but strictly positive number) player i does not possess any private informa-
tion.18 More speciﬁcally, assume that Pr(si = g|G)=P r ( si = b|B)=( 1−  )p,
Pr(si = φ|G)=P r ( si = φ|B)=  and Pr(si = b|G)=P r ( si = g|B)=( 1−  )(1 − p).
Player i’s message is now ∈{ b,φ,g}. Throughout this subsection, we assume that
c ∈ (1 − p, 1
2].
In this set-up there exists a semi-separating equilibrium in which the b-type and
the φ-type both send the same message (say, message ˆ si = φ) and the g-type sends
a diﬀerent message (say, message ˆ si = g). To understand this, we ﬁrst explain how
in equilibrium player j computes her posteriors given the diﬀerent sender’s strate-
gies. First, assume player j is an optimist. Upon receiving the message ˆ si = φ,s h e
computes:
Pr(G|sj = g,ˆ si = φ,only b-type and φ-type send message φ) >
1
2
Next, assume player j is a pessimist, she computes:
Pr(G|sj = b, ˆ si = φ,only b-type and φ-type send message φ) < 1 − p (12)
Similarly, if player i sends ˆ si = g, a pessimist computes:
Pr(G|sj = b, ˆ si = g,only g-type sends message g)=
1
2
From the previous section we know that a pessimistic sender strictly prefers to send
message ˆ si = φ rather than message ˆ si = g. Consider now a sender who doesn’t
possess any information. What is her expected gain of sending message ˆ si = g?I n
that case from above we know that there exists a continuation equilibrium in which
everyone invests at time one. As player i faces a positive gain of investing, she gets
1
2 − c ≥ c. What is her expected gain of sending message ˆ si = φ? Upon receiving
message ˆ si = φ, from (12) follows that pessimists do not invest at time one. Optimists
compute Pr(G|sj = g,ˆ si = φ) and invest with probability ρ∗(g,φ). If player i invests
she gets 1
2 − c. If she waits, she gets δW(1
2,ρ ∗(g,φ)). From our previous section we
know that the following equalities and inequality are satisﬁed:
gain send g =
1
2







∗(g,φ)) = gain send φ
18Note that, for simplifying reasons, we still assume that sj ∈{ g,b} (j  = i), i.e. only the sender
may be uninformed.
26Therefore it’s optimal for her to wait at time one and she strictly prefers to send
message ˆ si = φ.19
Finally, from the previous section we also know that an optimistic sender cannot
gain by deviating neither. The proposition below summarises the insight present in
this subsection:
Proposition 7 If there exists an arbitrarily small probability of player i being un-
informed, then ∀c ∈ (1 − p, 1
2], there exists a semi-separating equilibrium. In that
equilibrium ρ∗(g,g)=ρ∗(b,g)=1 .
Proof: See Appendix.
Two conclusions can be drawn out of our last proposition : (i) the separating equilib-
rium highlighted in Proposition (3) is driven by the assumption that the sender can
either be an optimist or a pessimist, (ii) however this does not mean that the insight
present in Proposition (3) is worthless. After all, the occurence of an informational
cascade along the equilibrium path is also stressed in Proposition (7). Our last Propo-
sition shows that one should not interpret Proposition (3) as follows: “Informational
cascades induce all possible types of players to truthfully reveal their private informa-
tion”. Instead, Proposition (3) should be interpreted as: “Informational cascades put
an upper limit above which some types of players don’t want to misrepresent their
information”.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we introduced cheap talk in an investment model with information ex-
ternalities. We ﬁrst showed that for low surplus projects, the unique monotone PBE
is the pooling one. This is because a pessimist is reluctant to divulge her bad informa-
tion as this worsens her second-period inference problem. For high surplus projects,
however, there exists a separating equilibrium: as a pessimist doesn’t learn anything
upon observing an informational cascade (which occurs whenever the sender sends
a favourable message) revelation of bad information is compatible with maximising
behaviour. A subsidy on low-surplus projects increases welfare, provided the subsidy
19In the equation above a ∈ [0,1) denotes the probability with which optimists must invest at
time one to make an uninformed sender indiﬀerent between investing and waiting. As  >0,
Pr(G|sj = g,ˆ si = φ) > 1
2. From the insight presented in Graph 2 we know that a<ρ ∗(g,φ). Note
that, when explaining the intuition behind our semi-separating equilibrium, we abstracted from the
fact that the sender observes ks and not k. As shown in the Appendix, this is without loss of
generality.
27does not turn a low-surplus project into a high-surplus one. Without an adequate
equilibrium selection theory, one cannot appraise the welfare consequences of a policy
aimed at subsidising high-surplus projects. Finally, we argued that in our context
“smart” people have more incentives to truthfully reveal their private information
than “stupid” ones.
The reader must bear in mind that we only introduced cheap talk in an endogenous-
queue set-up. More research is thus needed to check the robustness of exogenous-
queue herding models to the introduction of cheap talk. In our model one should
think about the sender as a famous investor who’s being interviewed by the media.
We believe it would be equally interesting to consider a set-up in which many players
have access to the communication channel through words. In particular, we have two
interpretations in mind. First, one could model “the economics of opinion polls” in
which a subset of the population is asked to simultaneously send a message to all
players in the economy. Second, one could model “the economics of business lunches”
in which a subset of the population meet and discuss the investment climate prior to
the ﬁrst investment date (the outcome of the discussion is not divulged to the other
players in the economy). We also believe this to constitute an interesting topic for
future research.
28Appendix
1 Some Deﬁnitions and Useful Lemmas
Let q ∈{ qω,q π,1 − p,p}.
ρ1 ≡ (ρ(b,h1),ρ(g,h1)), ˜ ρ1 ≡ (˜ ρ(b,h1), ˜ ρ(g,h1)), and
σ1 ≡ (σ(b,h1),σ(g,h1)), ˜ σ1 ≡ (˜ σ(b,h1), ˜ σ(g,h1)).
∆
r(q,σ1,ρ 1) ≡ δW(q,σ1,ρ 1) − (q − c
 ), (13)






max{0,Pr(G|q,k,ai) − c}Pr(k|q,ai)Pr(ai|q). (14)
Similarly,
∆









In words, ∆r(q,σ1,ρ 1) denotes a receiver’s diﬀerence between her gain of waiting and
her gain of investing given her posterior, σ1, ρ1 and sub.∆ s(p,ρ1) denotes the diﬀer-
ence between an optimistic sender’s gain of waiting and her gain of investing. Note
that the sender, when observing k investments, computes her posterior by explicitly
taking into account the fact that N − 1 (and not N − 2) players were investing with
probability ρ(b,h1) if they were pessimists and with probability ρ(g,h1) if they were
optimists. Observe that, as sub ∈ [− ,sub)(  >0 and   → 0 and the deﬁnition of
sub can be found in the body of our paper), 1 − p<c   <p .
Lemma 5 ∆r(q,σ1,ρ 1) is (weakly) increasing in (σ(g,h1) − σ(b,h1)).
Proof: As we are focusing on monotone strategies σ(g,h1) − σ(b,h1) ≥ 0. We prove
the Lemma in two diﬀerent steps. First, we show that ∆r(·) is weakly increasing
in σ(g,h1) for any given σ(b,h1) ≤ σ(g,h1). Next, we show that ∆r(·) is weakly
decreasing in σ(b,h1) for any given σ(b,h1) ≤ σ(g,h1).
Step 1: Fix an arbitrary σ(b,h1) ≤ σ(g,h1), and consider two investment proba-
bilities σ(g,h1) <σ  (g,h1). Call ai (a 
i) the time-one action taken by the sender when
σ1 =( σ(b,h1),σ(g,h1)) (σ1 =( σ(b,h1),σ (g,h1))). Having the optimistic sender
randomize with probability σ(g,h1) is ex ante identical to the following two-stage
29experiment: let the optimistic sender invest with probability σ (g,h1). Construct ai






ai = invest with probability
σ(g,h1)
σ(g,h1),




i =w a i t , ai = wait with probability 1.
Hence, a 
i is a suﬃcient statistic for ai and from Blackwell’s theorem follows that
∀σ(b,h1) ≤ σ(g,h1),W(q,(σ(b,h1),σ(g,h1)),ρ 1) ≤ W(q,(σ(b,h1),σ (g,h1)),ρ 1).
Step 2: Fix an arbitrary σ(g,h1) ≥ σ(b,h1), and consider two investment proba-
bilities σ (b,h1) <σ (b,h1). Call ai (a 
i) the time-one action taken by the sender when
σ1 =( σ(b,h1),σ(g,h1)) (σ1 =( σ (b,h1),σ(g,h1))). As above, one can construct ai on
the basis of a 
i in the following way: let the pessimistic sender wait with probability
1 − σ (b,h1).
If a 




ai = wait with probability
1−σ(b,h1)
1−σ(b,h1),




i = invest, ai = invest with probability 1.
As before, a 
i is a suﬃcient statistic for ai and from Blackwell’s theorem follows
that ∀σ(b,h1) ≤ σ(g,h1),W(q,(σ(b,h1),σ(g,h1)),ρ 1) ≤ W(q,(σ (b,h1),σ(g,h1)),ρ 1).
Q.E.D.
Lemma 6 ∆r(q,σ1,ρ 1) is strictly decreasing in q, ∀ρ1, ∀σ1.
Proof: Consider player l and player l . Both players received the same message from
the sender but player l anticipates that Θ = G with probability q, while player l 
anticipates that Θ = G with probability q . Suppose, wlog, that q  >q .O b s e r v et h a t









where I{·} represents the indicator function. Remind that x denotes a (1×N) vector
where the l-th element equals one if player l invested at time one and zero otherwise.
We start by proving the following inequality:
q
  − q ≥ W(q
 ,σ 1,ρ 1) − W(q,σ1,ρ 1). (16)
30Note that
W(q
 ,σ 1,ρ 1) − W(q,σ1,ρ 1) ≤ W(q




 (q,σ1,ρ 1) ≡ q
 
x





Hence, a suﬃcient condition for (16) to hold is that
q
  − q ≥ W(q
 ,σ 1,ρ 1) − W
 (q,σ1,ρ 1). (17)
Note that the RHS of (17) can be written as:
W(q
 ,σ 1,ρ 1) − W
 (q,σ1,ρ 1)=( q
  − q)
 
x
Pr(x|G,ˆ si)(1 − c)I{Pr(g|q,x)≥c} (18)
−(q




Note also that the LHS of (17) can be rewritten as:
q
  − q =( q
  − q)
 
x
Pr(x|G, ˆ si)(1 − c) − (q




Using (18) and (19), inequality (17) can be rewritten as
(q
  − q)
 
x
Pr(x|G, ˆ si)(1 − c)(1 − I{Pr(g|q,x)≥c})
+(q
  − q)
 
x
Pr(x|B,ˆ si)c(1 − I{Pr(g|q,x)≥c}) ≥ 0,
which is obviously satisﬁed. Using (13), one has
∆
r(q
 ,σ 1,ρ 1) − ∆
r(q,σ1,ρ 1)=δ(W(q
 ,σ 1,ρ 1) − W(q,σ1,ρ 1)) − (q
  − q).
From above (+ using the fact that δ<1), it follows that
∆
r(q
 ,σ 1,ρ 1) < ∆
r(q,σ1,ρ 1),
which proves the Lemma. Q.E.D.
Lemma 7 ∆s(p,ρ1)=∆ r(p,ρ1,ρ 1) and ∆s(1 − p,ρ1)=∆ r(1 − p,ρ1,ρ 1).
31Proof: Suppose sj = g (the argument if sj = b is fully symmetric). Observe that,
as qω = p,p l a y e rj did not learn anything about the sender’s type after the com-
munication stage. Observe also that the sender invests with the same probability as
the receivers. Both observations imply that observing ai = invest is informationally
equivalent to observing al = invest (where l  = j and l  = i). Hence, if player j waits
she has access to an information service that is ex ante identical to the one of the
optimistic sender. Thus, player j and the optimistic sender face the same gain of
waiting and the same gain of investing, which implies the Lemma. Q.E.D.
Lemma 8 ∆s(p,ρ1) is strictly decreasing in p, ∀ρ1.
Proof: From Lemma 7, we know that ∆s(p,ρ1)=∆ r(p,ρ1,ρ 1). But then it follows
from Lemma 6 that ∆r(p,ρ1,ρ 1) is strictly decreasing in p. Q.E.D.
Lemma 9 ∀ρ (g,h1) >ρ (g,h1), ∆r(q,σ1,(0,ρ(g,h1)) ≤ ∆r(q,σ1,(0,ρ  (g,h1)), where
the inequality becomes strict whenever ρ (g,h1) >ρ c ≥ 0.
Proof: First observe that whenever Pr(G|q,k,ai) is well deﬁned, one has:
Remark 1: Pr(G|q,k =0 ,a i) < Pr(G|q,k =1 ,a i) < ... < Pr(G|q,k = N − 2,a i).
Remark 2: Pr(G|q,k =0 ,a i) is strictly decreasing in ρ(g,h1).
Remark 3: Pr(G|q,k =0 ,a i =w a i t )≤ Pr(G|q,k =0 ,a i =i n v e s t ) .
Remark 3 rests on the observation that, as 1 − p<c  , σ∗(b,h1) = 0. Before deﬁning
ρc we must make a distinction between the following two cases: (1) Pr(G|q,0,wait)
is well deﬁned and (2) Pr(G|q,0,wait) is not well deﬁned. Observe that whenever
ρ (g,h1) > 0, (2) only happens if - after the communication stage - all players learned
that si = g and that σ(g,g) = 1. In (1) we must make the following distinction:
(a) Pr(G|q,wait) >cand (b) Pr(G|q,wait) ≤ c. In (a) we deﬁne ρc as the prob-
ability with which N − 2 receivers must invest (if they are optimists) such that
Pr(G|q,0,wait)=c. Observe that in (a)
Pr(G|q,0,wait,ρ(g,h1)=1 )<c<Pr(G|q,wait)=P r ( G|q,0,wait,ρ(g,h1)=0 ) ,
and, thus, in (a) 0 <ρ c < 1. In (b) there does not exist a ρ(g,h1) > 0 such that
Pr(G|q,0,wait)=c. Hence, in (b) we deﬁne ρc as being equal to zero. In (2) we
make the following distinction: (c) Pr(G|q,invest) >cand (d) Pr(G|q,invest) ≤ c.
As before, in (c) we deﬁne ρc as the probability with which the N − 2 receivers must
32invest (if they are optimists) such that Pr(G|q,0,invest)=c.I nt h i sc a s e0<ρ c < 1.
In (d) we deﬁne ρc as being equal to zero.
Call k  (k) the number of time-one investors when N − 2 receivers invest with
probability ρ (g,h1)( ρ(g,h1))if they are optimists, and with probability zero if they
are pessimists. From the explanation given in the text we know that k  is a suﬃcient
statistic for k. Consider two receivers: player 1 and player 2. Both players anticipate
that Θ = G with probability q. If player 1 (2) waits, she observes statistic k  (k).
If ρ(g,h1) <ρ  (g,h1) ≤ ρc, from Remarks 1, 2 and 3 we know that both players
always invest at time two and ∆r(q,σ1,(0,ρ(g,h1)) = ∆r(q,σ1,(0,ρ  (g,h1)). If ρc ≤
ρ(g,h1) <ρ  (g,h1), with strictly positive probability
Pr(G|q,k =0 ,a i) ≤ c<Pr(G|q,k
  = N − 2,a i),
in which case player two (wrongly) doesn’t invest and loses Pr(G|q,k  = N−2,a i)−c>






Lemma 9 gives rise to the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 ∀ρ (g,h1) >ρ (g,h1),
1) ∆s(p,(0,ρ  (g,h1))) ≥ ∆s(p,(0,ρ(g,h1))) where the inequality becomes strict when-
ever W(p,(0,ρ(g,h1))) >p− c,
2) ∆s(1 − p,(0,ρ  (g,h1))) > ∆s(1 − p,(0,ρ(g,h1))).
Proof: This Corollary was already proven in Chamley and Gale (1994) (see their
Proposition 2). In our set-up the Corollary follows from our previous Lemmas as the
argument below shows.
Suppose that q ∈{ 1 − p,p} and that σ1 = ρ1. From Lemma 7, we know that
player j’s gain of waiting is then identical to player i’s. Deﬁne ρc in a similar way as
in the proof of Proposition 9. Observe that 0 <ρ c < 1 ⇔ W(p,ρ1,ρ 1) >p− c.T h e
Corollary then follows from the proof of Lemma 9. Q.E.D.
Lemma 10 ∆r(1
2,σ 1,ρ 1) and ∆r(qω,σ 1,ρ 1) are independent of σ1.
Proof: Observe that W(q,σ1,ρ 1) can also be rewritten as
W(q,σ1,ρ 1)=P r ( ai =i n v e s t |sj, ˆ si)W
r(q
 ,ρ 1) (20)
+Pr(ai =w a i t |sj,ˆ si)W
r(q
  ,ρ 1), where






max{0,Pr(G|sj, ˆ si,k,invest) − c}Pr(k|sj, ˆ si,a i = invest) and
W
r(q
  ,ρ 1)=
 
k
max{0,Pr(G|sj, ˆ si,k,wait) − c}Pr(k|sj, ˆ si,a i =w a i t ) .
If q = 1






  ,ρ 1)=
 
k
max{0,Pr(G|sj,k,s i) − c}Pr(k|sj,s i),
which is independent of σ1. Q.E.D.
Lemma 11 ∀ρ(b,h1) <ρ  (b,h1), ∆r(q,σ1,(ρ(b,h1),1)) ≥ ∆r(q,σ1,(ρ (b,h1),1)), where
the inequality becomes strict whenever ρ(b,h1) <ρ c ≤ 1.
Proof: The proof mirrors the one we outlined in Proposition 9. Whenever ρ(b,h1) < 1
and ρ(g,h1) = 1, the act of waiting becomes informative and the probability with
which each pessimist decides to take the informative action equals (1−ρ(b,h1)). Take
any two waiting probabilities 1 − ρ(b,h1) > 1 − ρ (b,h1). Call z (z )t h en u m b e ro f
players who waited when pessimistic receivers randomised with probability 1−ρ(b,h1)
(1 − ρ (b,h1)) and optimistic receivers with probability zero. Having N − 2p l a y e r s
randomising with probability ρ(b,h1) (if they are pessimists) is ex ante identical to
the following two-stage experiment: take N − 2 players and let them wait (if they
are pessimists) with probability (1 − ρ(b,h1)). Next, take the z non-investors and
let them invest with probability
1−ρ(b,h1)
1−ρ(b,h1) . Hence, the statistic z  can be constructed
by adding noise to the statistic z. In the rest of the proof we always assume that
ρ(b,h1) < 1. Whenever Pr(G|q,z,ai) is well deﬁned one has:
Remark 1: Pr(G|q,z =0 ,a i) > Pr(G|q,z =1 ,a i) > ... > Pr(G|q,z = N − 2,a i).
Remark 2: Pr(G|q,z =0 ,a i) is strictly decreasing in ρ(b,h1).
Remark 3: Pr(G|q,z,wait) ≤ Pr(G|q,z,invest).
As above, we must distinguish among diﬀerent cases. If Pr(G|q,z =0 ,invest) is
well deﬁned and if Pr(G|q,invest) <c ,w ed e ﬁ n eρc as the probability with which
N − 2 receivers must invest (if they are pessimists) such that Pr(G|q,0,invest) = c.
34If Pr(G|q,0,invest) is not well deﬁned and if Pr(G|q,wait) <c ,w ed e ﬁ n eρc as the
probability with which N − 2 receivers must invest (if they are pessimists) such that
Pr(G|q,0,wait) = c. In all the other cases we deﬁne ρc as being equal to one.
If ρc ≤ ρ(b,h1) <ρ  (b,h1) from Remarks 1, 2 and 3 we know that both play-
ers never invest at time two and ∆r(q,σ1,(ρ(b,h1),1)) = ∆r(q,σ1,(ρ (b,h1),1)). If
ρ(b,h1) <ρ  (b,h1) ≤ ρc with a strictly positive probability
Pr(G|q,z = N − 2,a i) <c≤ Pr(G|q,z
  =0 ,a i),
in which case player 2 wrongly invests (at time two) and loses c − Pr(G|q,z = N −






Lemma 12 ∆r(qω,(0,0),(0,0)) < 0 < ∆r(qω,(0,0),(0,1)).
Proof: The fact that ∆r(qω,(0,0),(0,0)) < 0 trivially follows from our assumption
that δ<1. The second inequality rests on A2 and on the fcat that sub < sub1.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 13 ∆r(q,(0,0),(0,1)) > 0, ∀q and ∀sub ∈ [− ,sub).





2 Proof of all Lemmas and Propositions in our Paper
Proof of Lemma 1
Call nr the number of optimistic receivers in the economy. Observe that Pr(G|q,nr)
is increasing in nr. As explained in the paper if Pr(G|qω,n r =1 )=P r ( G|n =2 )<c ,
then Pr(G|q,nr =1 )<cand W(q,σ1,(0,1)) >q− c ∀q. Hence, we just focus on
the question: “How high must N be such that Pr(G|qω,n r =1 )<c ?” The posterior
qω = qω can only be generated if (i) player i sent a favourable message and (ii)






Np2(1 − p)N−2 + C2
N(1 − p)2pN−2
35where C2
N represents the number of possible combinations of two players out of a
population of N players. It can easily be shown that ∀N1 >N 2 ≥ 2:
p2(1 − p)N1−2
p2(1 − p)N1−2 +( 1− p)2pN1−2 <
p2(1 − p)N2−2
p2(1 − p)N2−2 +( 1− p)2pN2−2
From statistical textbooks (see e.g. De Groot (1970)) we know that in our set-up
Pr(G|n) is driven by the diﬀerence between the good and the bad signals in the
population.20 Therefore if N ≥ 5, Pr(G|n =2 )≤ 1 − p which is strictly lower than c
by A1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2 only considers the case in which c  = c. In Lemma 13 we already proved
that the inequality holds ∀c . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 only considers the case in which c  = c, while we prove the Proposition
∀c .
Proof of Point 1: If qπ < 1 − p<c   <q ω <p , ∃ a unique MCE in which
˜ ρ(b,b)=˜ σ(b,b)=0a n d˜ ρ(g,b) ∈ [0,1), ˜ σ(g,b)=1 .
The reader should bear in mind that when we claim uniqueness, we mean that (i) the
MCE must be stable (see our third equilibrium selection criterion explained in the
body of our paper) and (ii) we only focus on the class of monotone strategies (see our
second equilibrium selection criterion explained in the body of our paper).
Observe that qπ < 1 − p, which means that the sender sent message ˆ si = b.A s
qπ < 1 − p<c  , this implies that ˜ ρ(b,b)=˜ σ(b,b) = 0. We ﬁrst show that there does
not exist a monotone continuation equilibrium in which 0 < ˜ ρ(g,b) ≤ ˜ σ(g,b) < 1. As
both types are willing to randomise this means that
∆
r(qω,(0, ˜ σ(g,b)), ˜ ρ1)=0 ,
∆
s(p, ˜ ρ1)=0 .
20For example, Pr(G|n =1 ,N = 3) = Pr(G|n =2 ,N =5 )=1− p. In both cases: #pessimists
−# optimists = N − n − n =1 .
36Both equalities cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed as we can successively apply Lem-
mas 5, 6 and 7 to construct the following contradiction:
0=∆
r(qω,(0, ˜ σ(g,b)), ˜ ρ1)) ≥ ∆
r(qω, ˜ ρ1, ˜ ρ1) > ∆
r(p, ˜ ρ1, ˜ ρ1)=∆
s(p, ˜ ρ1)=0 .
Next, observe that there does not exist a monotone continuation equilibrium in which
˜ σ(g,b) < 1 and ˜ ρ(g,b) = 0, because the optimistic sender, knowing that ˜ ρ(g,b)=0 ,
then strictly prefers to invest at time one with probability one.
We now prove the existence of a monotone continuation equilibrium in which
˜ σ(g,b)=1a n d˜ ρ(g,b) ∈ [0,1). Consider the optimistic receiver. She knows that
˜ σ(g,b) = 1. There are then two possibilities: (i) ∆r(qω,(0,1),(0,0)) ≥ 0 and (ii)
∆r(qω,(0,1),(0,0)) < 0. In case (i), ˜ ρ(g,b) = 0. The optimistic sender knows that
˜ ρ(g,b) = 0 and thus stictly prefers to invest at time one with probability one (i.e.




From Lemma 9, there exists a unique ˜ ρ(g,b) ∈ (0,1) such that ∆r(qω,(0,1),(0, ˜ ρ(g,b))) =
0. Successively applying Lemmas 6, 5 and 7, one has
0=∆
r(qω,(0,1), ˜ ρ1) > ∆
r(p,(0,1), ˜ ρ1) ≥ ∆
r(p,(0, ˜ ρ(g,b)), ˜ ρ1)=∆
s(p, ˜ ρ1),
and the optimistic sender, knowing that ˜ ρ(g,b) is ﬁxed such that ∆r(qω,(0,1), ˜ ρ1)=0 ,
strictly prefers to invest at time one (i.e. ˜ σ(g,b) = 1). Q.E.D.
Proof of Point 2: If qπ < 1 − p<q ω ≤ c  <p , ∃ a unique MCE in which
˜ ρ(b,b)=˜ σ(b,b)=˜ ρ(g,b) = 0 and ˜ σ(g,b)=1 .
In this case the sender also sent message ˆ si = b.A sqπ < 1−p<c  ,˜ ρ(b,b)=˜ σ(b,b)=
0. Observe also that if qω ≤ c , ∀ρ(g,b) > 0, ∆r(qω,σ 1,(0,ρ(g,b))) > 0. Hence,
˜ ρ(g,b) = 0. The optimistic sender, knowing that ˜ ρ(b,b)=˜ ρ(g,b) = 0, strictly prefers
to invest at time one with probability one. Q.E.D.
Proof of Point 3: If 1 − p<q π <c   <p<q ω, ∃ a unique MCE in which
˜ σ(b,g)=˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g) = 0 and ˜ ρ(g,g) ∈ (0,1).
In this case the sender sent message ˆ si = g.A s1 − p<q π <c  ,˜ σ(b,g)=˜ ρ(b,g)=0 .
Suppose there exists a continuation equilibrium in which 0 < ˜ σ(g,g) ≤ ˜ ρ(g,g) < 1.
As both types of players are willing to randomize, this means that
∆
r(qω,(0, ˜ σ(g,g)),(0, ˜ ρ(g,g))) = 0,
37∆
s(p,(0, ˜ ρ(g,g))) = 0.
Both equalities cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed as we can successively apply Lem-
mas 5, 6 and 7 to construct the following contradiction:
0=∆
r(qω,(0, ˜ σ(g,g)), ˜ ρ1) ≤ ∆
r(qω, ˜ ρ1, ˜ ρ1) < ∆
r(p, ˜ ρ1, ˜ ρ1)=∆
s(p, ˜ ρ1)=0 .
Note also that there cannot exist continuation equilibria in which ˜ σ(g,g)=˜ ρ(g,g)=0
or in which ˜ σ(g,g)=˜ ρ(g,g) = 1 (both candidate continuation equilibria contradict
our assumption that δ<1 and Lemma 13).
Suppose ˜ σ(g,g) = 0. From Chamley and Gale, we know that there exists then a
unique ˜ ρ(g,g) ∈ (0,1) such that ∆r(qω,(0,0),(0, ˜ ρ(g,g))) = 0. Successively applying
Lemmas 6, 5 and 7, one has
0=∆
r(qω,(0,0), ˜ ρ1) < ∆
r(p,(0,0), ˜ ρ1) ≤ ∆
r(p,(0, ˜ ρ(g,g)), ˜ ρ1)=∆
s(p, ˜ ρ1),
and the pessimistic sender, knowing that ˜ ρ(g,g) is ﬁxed such that ∆r(qω,(0,0), ˜ ρ1)=
0, strictly prefers to wait at time one (i.e. ˜ σ(g,g) = 0). Q.E.D.
Proof of Point 4: If 1 − p<c   ≤ qπ < 1
2 <p<q ω, ∃ an MCE in which
˜ σ(b,g)=˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g) = 0 and ˜ ρ(g,g) ∈ (0,1). Depending on the values of
our exogenous parameters, there may also exist one (and only one) other MCE in
which ˜ σ(b,g) = 0 and ˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g)=˜ ρ(g,g)=1 .
In this case the sender sent message ˆ si = g.A s 1 − p<c  ,˜ σ(b,g) = 0. We prove
this point in seven diﬀerent steps. Steps 1, 2 and 3 show that there does not exist a
monotone continuation equilibrium in which more than one type of player randomizes.
Steps 4, 5 and 6 show that there exists a unique monotone continuation equilibrium
in which only one type of player (i.e. the optimistic receiver) randomises (while the
optimistic sender and the pessimistic receiver wait with probability 1). Step 7 inves-
tigates the existence of monotone continuation equilibria in which none of our players
randomize.
Step 1: There does not exist a monotone continuation equilibrium in which 0 <
˜ ρ(b,g) ≤ ˜ σ(g,g) ≤ ˜ ρ(g,g) < 1. Suppose the statement is true. Then one can apply
Lemma 6 to construct the following contradiction
0=∆
r(qπ, ˜ σ1, ˜ ρ1) > ∆
r(qω, ˜ σ1, ˜ ρ1)=0 .
38Step 2: There does not exist a monotone continuation equilibrium in which 0 =
˜ ρ(b,g) < ˜ σ(g,g) ≤ ˜ ρ(g,g) < 1. Suppose the statement is true. Successively applying
Lemmas 7, 6 and 5 we can construct then the following contradiction
0=∆
s(p,(0, ˜ ρ(g,g))) = ∆
r(p,(0, ˜ ρ(g,g)), ˜ ρ1) >
∆
r(qω,(0, ˜ ρ(g,g)), ˜ ρ1) ≥ ∆
r(qω,(0, ˜ σ(g,g)), ˜ ρ1)=0 .
Step 3: There does not exist a monotone continuation equilibrium in which 0 <
˜ ρ(b,g) ≤ ˜ σ(g,g) < 1=˜ ρ(g,g). Suppose the statement is true. This implies that
∆
r(qπ,(0, ˜ σ(g,g)),(˜ ρ(b,g),1)) = 0, (21)
∆
s(p,(˜ ρ(b,g),1)) = 0. (22)
Applying Lemmas 6 and 10 to equality (21), one has
0=∆








,(0,1), ˜ ρ1). (23)
Applying Lemmas 7 and 5 to equality (22), one has
0=∆
s(p, ˜ ρ1)=∆
r(p,(˜ ρ(b,g),1),(˜ ρ(b,g),1)) ≤ ∆
r(p,(0,1), ˜ ρ1). (24)
Inequalities (23) and (24) cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed as we run into the fol-





,(0,1), ˜ ρ1) > ∆
r(p,(0,1), ˜ ρ1) ≥ 0.
Step 4: There does not exist a monotone continuation equilibrium in which 0 =
˜ ρ(b,g) < ˜ σ(g,g) < 1=˜ ρ(g,g). This is easy to see: if ˜ ρ1 =( 0 ,1), from Lemmas 2, 5





and thus the optimistic sender is not indiﬀerent between investing and waiting.
Step 5: There does not exist a monotone continuation equilibrium in which 0 <
˜ ρ(b,g) < ˜ σ(g,g)=˜ ρ(g,g) = 1. Consider a pessimistic receiver. There are two
diﬀerent possibilities: (i) ∆r(qπ,(0,1),(1,1)) ≥ 0 or (ii) ∆r(qπ,(0,1),(1,1)) < 0. In
case (i), a pessimistic receiver, knowing that by waiting she will perfectly learn the
39sender’s type, prefers to wait and is thus unwilling to randomize. In case (ii) from




From Lemma 11 we know that there exists a unique ˜ ρ(b,g) such that
∆
r(qπ,(0,1),(˜ ρ(b,g),1)) = 0.
In this case c  < 1
2 and thus ∀sub ∈ [− ,sub), c ∈ (1 − p, 1
2). In particular this
implies that Pr(G|qπ,invest) = 1
2 >cand thus that ρc = 1 (for the deﬁnition of ρc,
see Lemma 11). From Lemma 11 we know that W(qπ,(0,1),(ρ(b,g),1)) is strictly
decreasing in ρ(b,g): this implies that a pessimistic receiver’s best response is in-
creasing in ρ(b,g): if ρ(b,g) > (<)˜ ρ(b,g), player j strictly prefers to invest (wait). It
is well-known that this implies that the candidate continuation equilibrium in which
0 < ˜ ρ(b,g) < ˜ σ(g,g)=˜ ρ(g,g) = 1 is unstable.
Step 6: There exists a unique monotone continuation equilibrium in which 0 =
˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g) < ˜ ρ(g,g) < 1. From Lemma 13, we know that ∆r(qω,(0,0),(0,0)) <
0 < ∆r(qω,(0,0),(0,1)). From Chamley and Gale we know that there exists a unique
˜ ρ(g,g) ∈ (0,1) such that ∆r(qω,(0,0),(0, ˜ ρ(g,g))) = 0. As qπ <q ω, from Lemma 6
follows that
0=∆
r(qω,(0,0),(0, ˜ ρ(g,g))) < ∆
r(qπ,(0,0),(0, ˜ ρ(g,g))),
and thus ˜ ρ(b,g) = 0. Similarly, using Lemmas 6, 5 and 7, one has
0=∆
r(qω,(0,0),(0, ˜ ρ(g,g))) < ∆
r(p,(0,0), ˜ ρ1) ≤ ∆
r(p, ˜ ρ1, ˜ ρ1)=∆
s(p, ˜ ρ1),
and thus ˜ σ(g,g)=0 .
Step 7: A continuation equilibrium in which 0 = ˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g)=˜ ρ(g,g)o ri n
which 0 = ˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g) < 1=˜ ρ(g,g) or in which 0 = ˜ ρ(b,g) < 1=˜ σ(g,g)=
˜ ρ(g,g) cannot exist because they contradict A2. As qπ <
1
2, this means that the
receivers, upon receiving the message ˆ si = g, still face some uncertainty concerning
the sender’s type. Depending on the values of our exogenous parameters there are two
possibilities: (i) ∆r(qπ,(0,1),(1,1)) > 0 and (ii) ∆r(qπ,(0,1),(1,1)) ≤ 0. In case (i)
a pessimistic receiver, knowing that by waiting she learns the sender’s type, strictly
prefers to wait and, hence, there does not exist a continuation equilibrium in which




40and thus ˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ ρ(g,g) = 1. The optimistic sender, knowing that ˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ ρ(g,g)=
1, strictly prefers to invest as well and thus ˜ σ(g,g) = 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Point 5: If 1 − p<c   ≤ qπ = 1
2 <p<q ω, ∃ two MCE’s. In the ﬁrst one
˜ σ(b,g)=˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g) = 0 and ˜ ρ(g,g) ∈ (0,1). In the second one ˜ σ(b,g) = 0 and
˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g)=˜ ρ(g,g)=1 .
In this proof q ∈{ qπ,q ω}. Observe that point 5 is identical to point 4, except that
qπ = 1
2, which means that the receivers perfectly inferred the sender’s type out of her
message. From the analysis in point 4, we know that there exists a stable monotone
continuation equililbrium in which ˜ σ(b,g)=˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g) = 0 and ˜ ρ(g,g) ∈ (0,1).
From Lemma 10 we know that ∆r(1
2,(0,1),(1,1)) = ∆r(1
2,(1,1),(1,1)) and that
∆r(qω,(0,1),(1,1)) = ∆r(qω,(1,1),(1,1)). Consider a receiver who anticipates that
˜ σ(b,g)=˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g)=˜ ρ(g,g) = 1. In that case there is no informational gain of
waiting. As δ<1, δW(q,(1,1),(1,1)) <q−c. Hence, there exists an  >0 such that
∀sub ∈ [− ,sub), δW(q,(1,1),(1,1)) <q− c , and all receivers prefer to invest with
probability one. Similarly, the optimistic sender, knowing that ˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ ρ(g,g)=1 ,
strictly prefers to invest at time one. Hence, in case 5 there always exists a monotone
continuation equilibrium in which ˜ σ(b,g) = 0 and ˜ ρ(b,g)=˜ σ(g,g)=˜ ρ(g,g)=1 .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Point 6: If qπ =1 − p<c   <q ω = p, ∃ a unique MCE in which
˜ σ(b,h1)=˜ ρ(b,h1) = 0 and ˜ σ(g,h1)=˜ ρ(g,h1) ∈ (0,1).
In this case qπ =1− p, which means that the receivers did not learn anything about
the sender’s type through her message. As qπ =1−p<c  ,˜ σ(b,h1)=˜ ρ(b,h1)=0 .A s
explained in our paper, in this case we impose the restriction that ˜ σ(g,h1)=˜ ρ(g,h1).
But then from Proposition 2 of Chamley and Gale follows that there exists a unique
˜ ρ(g,h1)s u c ht h a t∆ r(p,(0, ˜ ρ(g,h1)),(0, ˜ ρ(g,h1))) = ∆s(p,(0, ˜ ρ(g,h1))) = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 only considers the case in which c  = c, while we provide a proof ∀c .
In particular, we prove that ∀c  > 1
2, there exists a unique monotone PBE in which
σ∗(b,h0)=σ∗(g,h0) = 1. This PBE is supported by the out-of-equilibrium belief
that if ˆ si = b, the sender is a pessimist.
First we show that σ∗(g,h0) = 1. Suppose there exists a monotone PBE in which
0 ≤ σ∗(b,h0) ≤ σ∗(g,h0) < 1. σ∗(g,h0) can only be strictly lower than one if
41E(Ui|si = g,ˆ si = b) ≥ E(Ui|si = g,ˆ si = g). As σ∗(b,h0) ≤ σ∗(g,h0), this means that
if the optimistic sender “lies” and sends ˆ si = b, qω ≤ p. From points 1,2 and 6 of
Proposition 1, we know that her payoﬀ (net of the  -reputational cost) can then not
exceed p − c . Hence,
E(Ui|si = g,ˆ si = b)=p − c
  −  <E (Ui|si = g,ˆ si = g) = max{p − c
 ,δW(·)},
a contradiction.
As σ∗(g,h0) = 1, the message ˆ si = b can only come from a pessimistic sender (if
σ∗(b,h0) also equals one, then we assume that in the out-of-equilibrium event that
ˆ si = b, receivers believe with probability one that the sender is a pessimist). Hence,
Pr(G|sj = g,ˆ si = b)=1
2.S u p p o s eˆ si = b.T h e n ,qπ < 1 − p<q ω = 1
2 <c   <pand
from point 2 of Proposition 1, we know that ρ∗(b,b)=ρ∗(g,b) = 0. Suppose that
ˆ si = g. Then, 1 − p<q π ≤
1
2 <c   <p≤ qω and from points 3 and 6 of Proposition
1, we know that ρ∗(b,g) = 0 and that ρ∗(g,g) ∈ (0,1). Hence,
E(Ui|si = b, ˆ si = b)=0 ,
E(Ui|si = b, ˆ si = g)=δW(1 − p,(0,ρ
∗(g,g))) −  .
As ρ∗(g,g) > 0, this means that Pr(k = N − 1|si = b) > 0, in which case the
sender invests and gets a strictly positive payoﬀ. Hence, δW(1 − p,(0,ρ ∗(g,g))) > 0.
As   → 0, it follows that E(Ui|si = b, ˆ si = b) <E (Ui|si = b, ˆ si = g), and thus
σ∗(b,h0) = 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 only considers the case in which c  = c, while we provide a proof ∀c .I n
particular, we prove that ∀c  ≤
1
2, our game is characterised by two monotone PBE’s:
a pooling and a separating one. In the separating equilibrium, ρ∗(b,g)=ρ∗(g,g)=1 .
The pooling equilibrium is supported by the out-of-equilibrium belief that if ˆ si = b,
the sender is a pessimist.
From the proof of Proposition 2, we know that σ∗(g,h0) = 1. We prove the Propo-
sition in three diﬀerent steps. First we show that there does not exist a monotone
PBE in which 0 <σ ∗(b,h0) <σ ∗(g,h0) = 1. Next, we show that there exists a
separating equilibrium. Finally, we show that there exists a pooling equilibrium in
which σ∗(b,h0)=σ∗(g,h0)=1 .
42Step 1: Suppose there exists a monotone PBE in which 0 <σ ∗(b,h0) <σ ∗(g,h0)=1 .
σ∗(b,h0) can only be ∈ (0,1) if E(Ui|si = b, ˆ si = b)=E(Ui|si = b, ˆ si = g). If the
pessimistic sender sends ˆ si = b, qπ < 1 − p<c   ≤ qω = 1
2 <p , and from points 1
and 2 of Proposition 1, we know that ρ∗(b,b) = 0 and that ρ∗(g,b) ∈ [0,1). If she
sends ˆ si = g, there are two possibilities: (a) 1 − p<q π <c   <p<q ω and (b)
1 − p<c   ≤ qπ < 1
2 <p<q ω.
In case (a), from point 3 of Proposition 1 we know that ρ∗(b,g) = 0 and ρ∗(g,g) ∈
(0,1). Hence,
E(Ui|si = b, ˆ si = b)=δW(1 − p,(0,ρ
∗(g,b))), and
E(Ui|si = b, ˆ si = g)=δW(1 − p,(0,ρ
∗(g,g))) −  .
We now prove that ρ∗(g,g) >ρ ∗(g,b). If ρ∗(g,b) = 0, it trivially follows that ρ∗(g,g) >
ρ∗(g,b). Therefore, suppose that ρ∗(g,b) > 0. In that case from points 1, 2 and 3 of





















Hence, for equality 25 to be respected it follows from Lemma 9 that ρ∗(g,g) >
ρ∗(g,b). But then it follows from Corollary 1 that δW(1 − p,(0,ρ ∗(g,g))) >δ W(1 −
p,(0,ρ ∗(g,b))). As   → 0, it follows that in case (a) E(Ui|si = b, ˆ si = b) <E (Ui|si =
b, ˆ si = g), a contradiction.
In case (b), from point 4 of Proposition 1 we know that there always exists a
monotone continuation equilibrium in which ρ∗(b,g) = 0 and ρ∗(g,g) ∈ (0,1). De-
pending on the values of the exogenous parameters there may also exist another
monotone continuation equilibrium in which ρ∗(b,g)=ρ∗(g,g) = 1. If players focus
on the continuation equilibrium in which ρ∗(b,g) = 0 and ρ∗(g,g) ∈ (0,1), using a
reasoning identical to the one of the paragraph above, we know that the pessimistic
sender cannot be indiﬀerent between the two messages. Therefore, suppose players
43focus on the continuation equilibrium in which ρ∗(b,g)=ρ∗(g,g) = 1 (provided this
continuation equilibrium exists). In that case,
E(Ui|si = b, ˆ si = b)=δW(1 − p,(0,ρ
∗(g,b))), and
E(Ui|si = b, ˆ si = g)=− .
As δW(1 − p,(0,ρ ∗(g,b))) ≥ 0 > − , in case (b) the sender cannot be indiﬀerent
between the two messages.
Step 2: If the pessimistic sender deviates and sends ˆ si = g,1− p<c   ≤ qπ =
1
2 <p<q ω. From point 5 of Proposition 1, we know that there exists two monotone
continuation equilibria. If players focus on the one in which ρ∗(b,g) = 0 and ρ∗(g,g) ∈
(0,1), using a reasoning identical to the one of two paragraphs above, the pessimistic
sender strictly prefers to send ˆ si = g instead of ˆ si = b. If players focus on the one in
which ρ∗(b,g)=ρ∗(g,g)=1 ,
E(Ui|si = b, ˆ si = g)=− <0 ≤ E(Ui|si = b, ˆ si = b)=δW(1 − p,(0,ρ
∗(g,b))),
where the second inequality becomes strict whenever c  < 1
2. Hence, there exists a
monotone PBE in which σ∗(b,h0) = 0 and σ∗(g,h0)=1 .
Step 3: Suppose receivers update their posteriors under the assumption that σ∗(b,h0)=
σ∗(g,h0) = 1. In the out-of-equilibrium event that ˆ si = b, we assume that receivers
believe that the sender is a pessimist (with probability one). Therefore,
E(Ui|si = b, ˆ si = b)=δW(1 − p,(0,ρ
∗(g,b))).
If she sends ˆ si = g, qπ =1− p<c<q ω = p, and from point 6 of Proposition 1 we
know that ρ∗(b,g) = 0 and ρ∗(g,g) ∈ (0,1). Using a reasoning identical to the one
we outlined in step 1, ρ∗(g,g) >ρ ∗(g,b). From Corollary 1 (+ the fact that   → 0)
follows that the pessimistic sender strictly prefers to “lie” and send ˆ si = g. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
Deﬁne ρ∗(g,b,sub) as the probability which ensures the following equality
1
2





From the paper we know that
sub < δW(qω,(0,0),(0,1)) − (qω − c). (26)
44We now show that ∀sub ∈ [0,sub), ρ∗(g,b,sub) < 1.ρ ∗(g,b,sub) = 1 only if
1
2











Inequalities 26 and 27 cannot both be satisﬁed as we can use Lemmas 6 and 10 to







− c) >δ W(qω,(0,1),(0,1))− (qω − c)
= δW(qω,(0,0),(0,1)) − (qω − c) > sub.
As ρ∗(g,b,sub) < 1 it trivially follows from Lemma 9 that ρ∗(g,b,sub) is strictly
increasing in sub. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4
The proof is similar to the one of Lemma 3. Deﬁne ρ∗(g,h1,sub) as the probability
which ensures the following equality
p − c + sub = δW(p,(0,ρ
∗(g,h1,sub)),(0,ρ
∗(g,h1,sub))).
∀sub ∈ [0,sub), ρ∗(g,h1,sub) < 1 as we otherwise run into the following contradiction
sub ≥ δW(p,(0,1),(0,1))− (p − c) >δ W(qω,(0,1),(0,1)) − (qω − c)
= δW(qω,(0,0),(0,1)) − (qω − c) > sub.
As ρ∗(g,h1,sub) is always strictly lower than one, it trivially follows from Lemma 9
that ρ∗(g,h1,sub) is strictly increasing in sub. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
From Corollary 1, we know that δW(1−p,(0,ρ ∗(·))) is strictly increasing in ρ∗(·). If
qπ =
(1−p)2
p2+(1−p)2, this means that the pessimistic receivers learned that si = b. Hence,
Pr(G|qπ,wait) <cand ρc = 0 (for the deﬁnition of ρc, see Lemma 9). From Lemma 9
then follows that δW(
(1−p)2
p2+(1−p)2,(0,1),(0,ρ ∗(g,b))) is also strictly increasing in ρ∗(·).
This insight - combined with our results summarised in Lemmas 3 and 4 - allows us
to conclude that equations 6 and 8 are strictly increasing in sub. The remainder of
the proof can be found in the body of our paper. Q.E.D.
45Proof of Proposition 7
We redeﬁne σ1 as σ1 =( σ(b,h1),σ(φ,h1),σ(g,h1)), where σ(φ,h1) represents the
probability with which the uninformed sender invests at time one given the message
she sent at time zero. From the insight summarised in Proposition 3 it should be














The ﬁrst equality sign states that optimists - after having received the message ˆ si = φ
-m u s tﬁ xρ∗(g,φ) such that they are indiﬀerent between investing and waiting. Upon
receiving message ˆ si = φ,p l a y e rj knows that Pr(si = g|sj,ˆ si = φ) = 0 and thus the
receiver’s gain of waiting is independent of σ(g,φ) (which explains the second equality
sign). The ﬁrst inequality sign is based on the insight, explained in the body of our
paper, that ks is a suﬃcient statistic for k. The second inequality sign is based on
Lemma 6 (in the proof of Lemma 6, we do not rely on the fact that the sender can
only send two messages). The strings of equalities and inequalities presented above
prove that an uninformed sender strictly prefers to send ˆ si = φ and wait, instead of













The ﬁrst and the second inequality signs rely on Lemmas 5 and 6. Note that the
last equality sign only holds when   → 0. Hence, the optimist - independently of her
message - invests at time one and she cannot gain by deviating. Q.E.D.
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